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OHIO’S MODERN
COURTS AMENDMENT MUST BE
AMENDED: WHY AND HOW*
RICHARD S. WALINSKI** & MARK D. WAGONER, JR.***
ABSTRACT
A 1968 amendment to the Ohio Constitution granted the Supreme Court of Ohio
the authority to promulgate “rules governing practice and procedure” for Ohio courts.
The amendment also provided that “[a]ll laws in conflict with such rules shall be of
no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect” and that no rule may
“abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.”
Although the amendment was explicit about automatic repeal of existing laws, it
says nothing about whether the General Assembly may legislate on a procedural
matter after a court rule takes effect. That silence has caused enduring confusion. Since
1968, the Supreme Court of Ohio has considered dozens of cases in which a courtpromulgated rule appears to conflict with a subsequently enacted statute.
The court has reached two views on whether later-enacted statutes that conflict
with existing court rules are constitutional. One holds that, because the constitution
grants rulemaking authority exclusively to the court, the General Assembly has no
authority once the court promulgates a procedural rule. It has also held the opposite:
the General Assembly may legislate on a procedural matter already addressed in a
court rule if the legislature intends to remake that “matter of practice or procedure”
into a “substantive right.”
These contradictory interpretations cannot both be right. Yet each remains
controlling precedent in Ohio.
Neither of the court’s contradictory rulings rests on a cogent textual analysis of the
1968 amendment. This failing, however, is no reflection on the court. A definitive
resolution of the conflicting interpretations is impossible because the sparse language
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to Amend Article IV, § 5(B) of the Ohio Constitution 1–31 (2016).
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Procedure; Public Member, Ohio Constitutional Modernization Commission.
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of the amendment simply does not contain enough textual foundation from which to
derive a compelling, permanent answer—one way or the other.
The authors propose an amendment that would add language to the 1968
amendment. By providing a textual basis for the court’s second interpretive ruling, it
would make clear and permanent the legislature’s authority to share in the process of
forming court rules. It would align Ohio’s rulemaking process with Congress’s
participation in rulemaking for federal courts and with the large majority of states that
preserve for their legislatures at least some participation in forming the content of rules
of practice and procedure.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A void has existed in the Ohio Constitution since adoption of the Modern Courts
Amendment in 1968. It exists in what is now Art. IV, § 5(B). This provision gives the
Supreme Court of Ohio the power to promulgate “rules governing practice and procedure”
in all Ohio courts.1 This authority previously resided in the General Assembly under Art.

1 OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B) (“The Supreme Court shall prescribe rules governing practice and
procedure in all courts of the state, which rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive
right. Proposed rules shall be filed by the court, not later than the fifteenth day of January, with the clerk
of each house of the General Assembly during a regular session thereof, and amendments to any such
proposed rules may be so filed not later than the first day of May in that session. Such rules shall take
effect on the following first day of July, unless prior to such day the General Assembly adopts a
concurrent resolution of disapproval. All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or
effect after such rules have taken effect.”).
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II, § 12—since the adoption of the 1851 Constitution.3
Although Art. IV, § 5(B) now grants rulemaking authority to the court, the
Amendment is silent on what authority, if any, the General Assembly retains after the
Supreme Court of Ohio exercises its authority allocated under the Amendment. This
silence has produced lingering uncertainties in Ohio law. This Article proposes an
amendment to Art. IV, § 5(B) that would fill the void.
II. SUMMARY OF A CURRENT PROBLEM
The Modern Courts Amendment addressed several matters affecting Ohio’s court
system. Like many provisions in the Ohio Constitution, the portion of the Amendment
that addresses rulemaking—and that became Art. IV, § 5(B)—is sparsely written.4 In
addition to granting rulemaking power to the state supreme court, Art. IV, § 5(B)
prescribes one consequence that flows from the court’s exercise of the authority and
adds one limitation on the scope of that authority.5 The consequence is that a courtpromulgated rule supersedes all laws then in effect that conflict with it; it states, “[a]ll
laws in conflict . . . shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken
effect.”6 The limitation is that a court-promulgated rule may not “abridge, enlarge, or
modify a substantive right.”7 Beyond these two features of the court’s rulemaking
authority, Art. IV, § 5(B) is silent.8

2 Id. art. II, § 1 (“The legislative power of the state shall be vested in a General Assembly
consisting of a Senate and House of Representatives . . . .”).
3 See Josiah H. Blackmore II, Not from Zeus’s Head Full-Blown: The Story of Civil
Procedure in Ohio, in 1 THE HISTORY OF OHIO LAW 441–57, 457 (Michael Les Benedict & John
F. Winkler eds., 2004) (“In 1850 Ohioans . . . made the legislature responsible for reforming
judicial procedure. The Modern Courts Amendment transferred that authority to the supreme
court, leaving the legislature only the minimal authority to disapprove the court’s propositions.
. . .”). Adopted in 1850 and as amended in 1953, the Ohio Constitution, article II, section 1
states in pertinent part:

The legislative power of the state shall be vested in a General Assembly consisting
of a Senate and House of Representatives but the people reserve to themselves the
power to propose to the General Assembly laws and amendments to the
constitution, and to adopt or reject the same at the polls on a referendum vote as
hereinafter provided.
OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1 (amended 1953). By various statutes enacted between 1803 and 1959,
the General Assembly addressed the topic of the Supreme Court of Ohio’s rulemaking authority
over matters of practice and procedure, sometimes delegating authority to the courts, sometimes
expanding it, sometimes narrowing it, and sometimes rescinding it. See Jeffrey A. Parness &
Christopher C. Manthey, Public Process and Supreme Court of Ohio Rulemaking, 28 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 249, 250–55 (1979). See also JAMES L. YOUNG, OHIO LEGAL CENTER INSTITUTE, PUB.
NO. 105 1 EVIDENCE IN OHIO 2.13–2.17 (1978).
4

OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B).

5

Id.

6

Id.

7

Id.

8

Id.
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The most important omission in Art. IV, § 5(B) is any reference to whether the
General Assembly may legislate on issues of “practice and procedure” after a courtpromulgated rule takes effect.9 That question is important because—as a direct result
of Art. IV, § 5(B)’s silence—the Supreme Court of Ohio has considered dozens of
cases in which it attempted to divine the answer. 10 Divining it, however, has been
difficult.
The court has answered this question in two ways that directly contradict each
other. The court’s first answer was that the Modern Courts Amendment barred the
General Assembly from legislating on a matter of practice or procedure once the court
successfully promulgated a rule on the matter.11 A more recent line of cases, however,
held that the General Assembly may change the content of a court-promulgated rule
of practice or procedure, but only if the legislature intended to convert the procedural
matter addressed in the rule into a “substantive right.” 12 In announcing this second
interpretation of Art. IV, § 5(B), however, the court did not overrule or modify its
ruling in the first interpretation.13 Moreover, the court has yet to do so when applying
its second interpretation in later cases.14
The two interpretations cannot both be correct. The court cannot bar the General
Assembly from legislating on a matter of practice or procedure and simultaneously
recognize that the General Assembly retained the power to do so.
The mere existence of inconsistent interpretations does not itself justify amending
the constitution. But this inconsistency relating to practice and procedure is a rare
instance that does require such amendment.
If Art. IV, § 5(B)’s few clauses were statutory rather than constitutional, the
provision giving authority to the supreme court might easily be harmonized with the
General Assembly’s plenary legislative authority under Art. II, §1.15 A court applying
common-law rules of statutory interpretation might reason that a statute worded like
Art. IV, § 5(B) leaves legislative authority in the General Assembly, except to the
extent that the Amendment clearly places authority in the court.16 This interpretive
9

Id.

10

See, e.g., State ex rel. Loyd v. Lovelady, 840 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 2006); Rockey v. 84
Lumber Co., 611 N.E.2d 789 (Ohio 1993).
11 Rockey, 611 N.E.2d 791–92 (“The Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, which were
promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 5(B), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution,
must control over subsequently enacted inconsistent statutes purporting to govern procedural
matters”) (internal footnote omitted), aff’d, State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v.
Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 1999).
12 Havel v. Villa St. Joseph, 963 N.E.2d 1270 (Ohio 2012); Lovelady, 840 N.E.2d at 1064
(“If the legislature intended the enactment to be substantive, then no intrusion on this court’s
exclusive authority over procedural matters has occurred. . . . Thus, although [the statute is] . . .
necessarily packaged in procedural wrapping, it is clear to us that the General Assembly
intended to create a substantive right to address potential injustice”) (emphasis added).
13

Lovelady, 840 N.E.2d. at 1063–65.

14

Havel, 963 N.E.2d at 1277–79.

15

Compare OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B), with id. art. II § 1.

16

See id. art. IV, § 5(B).
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technique for filling the void in a statute is not available when interpreting a
constitution17—at least not in a way that would have a permanent effect on the
meaning of the constitution.
First, common-law rules for interpretation and construction stand on a different
footing when used to interpret statutes than when used to interpret constitutions.18 The
common-law rules work well when applied to legislation—or similar forms of positive
law—because the rules rest ultimately upon the recognition that the enacting body has
the power to amend the legislation and, thus, to correct it or to otherwise respond to
judicial interpretations.19 That ease of correction is not present when changing a
constitution.20 Because amending the constitution requires statewide voter approval,
the process—even in Ohio—is arduous and expensive.21 As a result, rules of
interpretation premised on ease of correction have little applicability to the
interpretation of constitutional texts.22
Even if common-law rules for construing constitutions were the same as the rules
for construing statutes, the rules themselves are numerous and often produce
conflicting interpretations.23 Any attempt to fill the void in Art. IV, § 5(B) solely

17

See BRYAN A. GARNER ET AL., THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT (2016).

18 See id. at 352 (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991)) (“The doctrine of
stare decisis applies less rigidly in constitutional cases than it does in statutory cases . . . . Stare
decisis is flexible in constitutional cases because ‘correction through legislative action is
practically impossible.’”); see also Rocky River v. State Emp’t Relations Bd., 539 N.E.2d 103,
106 (Ohio 1989) (“The doctrine [of stare decisis] . . . concerns . . . the construction of statutes,
ordinances, rules and regulations. The doctrine does not apply with the same force and effect
when constitutional interpretation is at issue.”); United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 101 (1978)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406–08
(1932)) (“[I]n cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative
action is practically impossible, this court has often overruled its earlier decisions. The Court
bows to the lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning, recognizing that the process
of trial and error, so fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial
function.”).
19

GARNER ET AL., supra note 17, at 352.

20

Id.

21

See OHIO CONST. art XVI, §1.

22

Id.

23

Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950); cf. CARLETON K.
ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 578 (7th ed. 1964) (echoing Llewellyn by saying that “[t]here is
scarcely a rule of statutory interpretation, however orthodox, which is not qualified by large
exceptions, some of which so nearly approach flat contradictions that the rule itself seems to
totter on its base”); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law:
Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 596 (1992) (“We
agree that the malleability of the canons prevents them from constraining the Court or forcing
certain results in statutory interpretation through deductive reasoning from first canonical
principles. Yet we also think that the substantive canons are connected in an important way with
the results the Court reaches in statutory cases . . . . The canons are one means by which the
Court expresses the value choices that it is making or strategies it is taking when it interprets
statutes (thus, results produce canons). . . . The precise way in which a Court deploys
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through judicial application of a common-law rules of interpretation or construction
would endure only until the court—perhaps when differently aligned politically—
focuses on a different rule of interpretation that supports some other reading of the
constitution.
Exacerbating the inadequacy of these common-law rules of interpretation is the
Amendment’s sparse language. There was simply not enough firm ground—i.e. not
enough in textual content—in the Amendment for the Supreme Court of Ohio to build
a compelling answer to where Art. IV, § 5(B) leaves the full breadth of authority to
prescribe the content of court rules.
The amendment proposed in this Article would fill the void permanently by
interlineating language that would answer this question. The amendment would do so
by inserting language that reflects the court’s second interpretation.
Selecting the second interpretation, rather than the first, is not arbitrary. This
proposal rejects the court’s first interpretation—holding the General Assembly to be
disenfranchised once a court-promulgated rule of practice or procedure becomes
effective under Art. IV, § 5(B).24 There are two reasons. First, that interpretation
suffers from a fundamental, structural flaw. Its allocation of mutually exclusive
spheres of legislative authority between the court and legislature turns on a false and
irredeemably blurred distinction between substance and procedure. Second, the
court’s first interpretation of its lawmaking authority recognized no veto authority in
the Governor, but only in the transient and demonstrably fragile authority that Art. IV,
§ 5(B) currently affords the General Assembly to review a proposed Rule.25 If the first
interpretation resurfaced as the prevailing law of Ohio, the court would again act
effectively as the only governmental check on the exercise of its own rulemaking
activity.
The path we propose reflects the Modern Courts Amendment’s ancestry. The
rulemaking provisions of the Modern Courts Amendment were modeled after the
federal Rules Enabling Act of 1934.26 The Supreme Court of Ohio’s second
interpretation recognizes a relationship between the General Assembly and the court
that allows for shared authority in court rulemaking; this sharing resembles what the
Rules Enabling Act created between Congress and the Supreme Court of the United
States.27
substantive canons of statutory construction reflects an underlying ‘ideology,’ or mix of values
and strategies that the Court brings to statutory interpretation.”).
24

Rockey v. 84 Lumber Co., 611 N.E.2d 789 (Ohio 1993).

25

Id.

26

Rules Enabling Act of 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2071 (2017)).
27 The Honorable Jeffrey S. Sutton of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit has long urged state courts to recognize that their state constitutions need not be
interpreted in the same way that federal courts interpret the U.S. Constitution, even when
provisions of the federal constitutions are worded similarly. See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Sutton, What
Does—and Does Not—Ail State Constitutional Law, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 687, 710 (2011)
(“There is no reason to think, as an interpretive matter, that constitutional guarantees of
independent sovereigns, even guarantees with the same or similar words, must be construed the
same. Still less is there reason to think that a highly generalized guarantee, such as a prohibition
on ‘unreasonable’ searches, would have just one meaning for a range of differently situated
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This Article proposes that the legislature amend Art. IV, § 5(B) by adding the
italicized language:
(B) The supreme court shall prescribe rules governing practice and
procedure in all courts of the state, which rules shall not abridge, enlarge,
or modify any substantive right. Proposed rules shall be filed by the court,
not later than the fifteenth day of January, with the clerk of each house of
the general assembly during a regular session thereof, and amendments to
any such proposed rules may be so filed not later than the first day of May
in that session. Such rules shall take effect on the following first day of
July, unless prior to such day the general assembly adopts a concurrent
resolution of disapproval. All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no
further force or effect after such rules have taken effect. The general
assembly may change rules promulgated hereunder by introducing a bill
(1) that states in its preamble specifically that it is the legislature’s purpose
to create a substantive right and (2) that is enacted into law as provided in
Article II, Section 16.
III. THE MODERN COURTS AMENDMENT AND THE FEDERAL RULES ENABLING ACT
Congress enacted the federal Rules Enabling Act in 1934.28 It authorizes the United
States Supreme Court “to prescribe, by general rules, . . . the practice and procedure
of the district courts of the United States . . . .”29 In the decades that followed its
enactment, the Enabling Act was the fountainhead for a deluge of court rulemaking,
both federally and in the states.30 The Supreme Court of the United States, exercising
its authority granted under the Act, began the flow by promulgating Rules of Civil
sovereigns.”); see also William J. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
By proposing to amend Art. IV, § 5(B) in a manner that would create an effect similar to that
created by the federal Rules Enabling Act, this proposed amendment does not conflict with
Judge Sutton’s view of states’ autonomy. This proposal is driven, not by any reflexive deference
to the federal approach to rulemaking, but rather by the fact that shared authority in prescribing
the content of court rules is the only workable way to approach any allocation of rulemaking
that separates the authority between court and legislature based on the false dichotomy between
substance and procedure.
28 Rules Enabling Act of 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2071 (2017)).
29 Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1106
(1982).
30 The reasons why the Rules Enabling Act of 1934 spawned this rush of court-promulgated
rules are beyond the scope of this Article. The United States Supreme Court had been authorized
since at least 1842 “to regulate the whole practice [in the district and circuit courts of the United
States], so as to prevent delays, and to promote brevity and succinctness in all pleadings and
proceedings therein, and to abolish all unnecessary costs and expenses in any suit therein.” Act
of August 23, 1842, ch. 188, § 6, 5 Stat. 516, 518 (1842). For the evolution of the Supreme
Court’s rulemaking authority before enactment of the Rules Enabling Act, see Burbank, supra
note 29, at 1034–98. A very small number of state legislatures had already passed bills
authorizing courts to promulgate rules of procedure. See, e.g., Rulemaking Principle Enacted in
Delaware and Washington, 9 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 134 (1925).
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Procedure in 1938.31 Under parallel legislation, the Court eventually issued rules
covering, among others, criminal32 and appellate procedure.33 Many states have since
come to accept rulemaking authority in their highest courts, whether shared with the
state legislature34—as the great majority of states do35—or held exclusively by the
court.36 Most states have allocated this authority by statutory delegation or by
variously worded constitutional amendments. 37
With adoption of the Modern Courts Amendment in 1968, Ohio joined—albeit
belatedly38—the movement toward court-promulgated rules.39 The Amendment was

31

Burbank, supra note 29, at 1028.

32

Effective March 21, 1946. See 327 U.S. 821; CONG. REC., vol. 91, pt. 1, p. 17, Exec.
Comm. 4; H. Doc. 12, 79th Cong.
33 Effective July 1, 1968. See 389 U.S. 1063; CONG. REC., vol. 114, pt. 1, p. 113, Exec.
Comm. 1361; H. Doc. 204, 90th Cong.
34 See, e.g., MD. CONST. art. IV, pt. I, § 18(a) (“The Court of Appeals from time to time
shall adopt rules and regulations concerning the practice and procedure in and the administration
of the appellate courts and in the other courts of this State, which shall have the force of law
until rescinded, changed or modified by the Court of Appeals or otherwise by law. The power
of courts other than the Court of Appeals to make rules of practice and procedure, or
administrative rules, shall be subject to the rules and regulations adopted by the Court of
Appeals or otherwise by law.”).
35

See infra notes 219–23 and accompanying text.

36

See, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 5 (“The supreme court shall by general rules establish,
modify, amend and simplify the practice and procedure in all courts of this state. . . .”);
McDougall v. Schanz, 597 N.W.2d 148, 154 (Mich. 1999) (“It is beyond question that the
authority to determine rules of practice and procedure rests exclusively with this Court.”).
37

See infra notes 219–23 and accompanying text.

38

By 1968, the Supreme Court of the United States had already recognized that the
distinction between substance and procedure, which lies at the heart of the Modern Courts
Amendment’s allocation of rulemaking authority, is a false dichotomy. See Hanna v. Plumer,
380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965); discussion infra Parts III–IV.
A fundamental rethinking about the relationship between substance and procedure in the
rulemaking context had already begun. See Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process:
Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 877, 900
(1999) (“The professional romance with court rulemaking and the Federal Rules began to sour
in the early 1970s. Critics attacked the notion that there was an ideal procedure embedded in
existing practice and codified in the Federal Rules. As a result, the boundary between procedure
and substance blurred, and the case for expert rulemaking weakened. During the 1960s and early
1970s, new substantive rights were created in response to growing public concern about civil
rights, consumer welfare, and environmental protection. At the same time, public interest groups
and lawyers inspired by the successes of the civil rights movement began to view litigation as a
vehicle for social reform. The resulting changes in the character of federal litigation gave rise
to concerns about the adequacy of the existing procedural system to promote substantive values.
Many of the new public interest cases . . . focused attention on the close relationship between
procedure and substantive law.”) (internal citations omitted).
39

See Blackmore II, supra note 3, at 457.
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“the most significant change in the judiciary since ratification of the Ohio Constitution
of 1850.”40
The kinship between the Modern Courts Amendment and the federal Rules
Enabling Act is evident in their striking similarities.41 One similar provision is the
clause authorizing the Supreme Court of Ohio to “prescribe rules governing practice
and procedure in all courts of the state.”42 That clause is now Art. IV, § 5(B).43 Besides
using nearly identical language to grant authority to prescribe laws “governing
practice and procedure in all courts,” the Ohio amendment uses identical language
prohibiting the court from promulgating a rule that would “abridge, enlarge, or modify
any substantive right.”44 Art. IV, § 5(B) also has a supersession clause like the one in
the Rule Enabling Act.45 Both state that, if an existing statute conflicts with a duly

40

Id.

41 Compare OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B) with 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1966). From 1966 until
the Modern Courts Amendment was adopted, the federal Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072,
stated:

Rules of civil procedure for district courts.
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe, by general rules, the forms of
process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure of the district
courts of the United States in civil actions.
Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right and shall preserve
the right of trial by jury as at common law and as declared by the Seventh Amendment
to the Constitution.
Such rules shall not take effect until they have been reported to Congress by the
Attorney General at the beginning of a regular session and until after the close of such
session.
All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules
have taken effect. Nothing in this title, anything to the contrary notwithstanding, shall
in any way limit, supersede, or repeal any such rules heretofore prescribed by the
Supreme Court.
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1966). For the succession of amendments to the 1934 Act before the
enactment of the Modern Courts Amendment, see Stuart M. Lockman, Congressional
Discretion in Dealing with the Federal Rules of Evidence, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 798, 799 n.9
(1973). For more historical background of the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, see 4 CHARLES A.
WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, CIVIL § 1001
(2005); Charles E. Clark & James WM. Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure: I. The
Background, 44 YALE L.J. 387 (1935); George H. Jaffin, Federal Procedural Revision, 21 VA.
L. REV. 504 (1935); Edson R. Sunderland, The Grant of Rule-Making Power to the Supreme
Court of the United States, 32 MICH. L. REV. 1116 (1934).
42

Another provision of the Modern Courts Amendment gave the supreme court authority
over all matters regarding the admission to the bar and the discipline of lawyers and judges.
OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 2(B)(1)(g).
43

OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B).

44

Id.

45

Id.
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promulgated court rule, the statute will no longer have any force or effect after the rule
takes effect.46
The process for promulgating rules is also similar. Each court may propose a rule
of practice or procedure only once a year.47 The legislature then has a defined period
in which to consider the proposed rule.48 Unless the legislature takes action by a
designated date to disapprove the proposed rule, the court’s proposal becomes law by
default.49
Even more important than what the Rules Enabling Act and the Modern Courts
Amendment say is what the two texts leave unsaid. Both are silent on two crucial
questions. First, neither defines how “a rule of practice and procedure” is to be
distinguished from “a substantive right.” 50 As discussed infra, this silence remains a
vexing problem.51 Second, even though both the Enabling Act and Art. IV, § 5(B)
contain supersession clauses stating that existing statutory law inconsistent with a
newly promulgated court rule is deemed repealed, neither addresses whether or to
what extent Congress or the General Assembly may legislate on a matter of “practice
and procedure” after a court-promulgated rule takes effect.52 The Ohio Constitution’s

46

Compare OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B) (“All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of
no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.”) with Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 723(b) (1934) (“All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after
such rules have taken effect.”).
47

Compare OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B) (“Proposed rules shall be filed by the court, not
later than the fifteenth day of January, with the clerk of each house of the general assembly
during a regular session thereof”) with 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1950) (corresponds to the version
amended by the Act of May 10, 1950, ch. 174, § 2, 64 Stat. 158 (stating that proposed rules
must be “reported to Congress by the Attorney General at the beginning of a regular session”).
48 Compare OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B) (“Such rules shall take effect on the following first
day of July, unless prior to such day the general assembly adopts a concurrent resolution of
disapproval”) with 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2017) (“Such rules shall not take effect . . . until after the
close of such session”).
49

See OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B).

50 Paul D. Carrington, ‘Substance’ and ‘Procedure’ in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 281, 284 (1989).
51

Id. (“The interpretive problem [with the Rules Enabling Act] lay in the mystic terms
‘substance’ and ‘procedure’ as used in the Act.”). Specifically addressing Art. IV, § 5(B), James
L. Young described the substance/procedural dichotomy as the central source of uncertainty in
the Modern Courts Amendment. He wrote:
Historically, the responsibility for procedural rules has been within the legislative
prerogative and also within the judicial prerogative. The approach has varied with the
times. The Modern Courts Amendment resolves a part of the problem by placing a duty
for procedural rules on the Supreme Court. It leaves the underlying question
unanswered. That question is the distinction between substance and procedure . . . .
Young, supra note 3, at 2.17.
52

Id. at 322.
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silence on this point also implicates an elementary part of the separation-of-powers
doctrine.53
As discussed below, the silence about Congress’s authority has caused little
disruption under the federal Rules Enabling Act. And the silence about the General
Assembly’s authority presented only a theoretical problem in 1968 when Ohio ratified
the Modern Courts Amendment. But the omission has become a recurring problem in
Ohio because the Ohio legislature often enacts legislation that conflicts with courtpromulgated, apparently procedural rules.54
One might naturally assume that two similar pieces of positive law, the Rules
Enabling Act and Art. IV, § 5(B), would generate similar judicial interpretations. They
have not. Instead, the federal and Ohio experiences have substantial differences. Since
1934, the United States Supreme Court never has held that a court-promulgated rule
abridged, enlarged, or modified a substantive right. In fact, the Court has rarely faced
this question.55
This is quite different from the Ohio experience. Since 1968, the Supreme Court
of Ohio has considered more than three dozen cases involving potential conflicts
between statutes and court rules.56 Finding conflicts in at least thirty-two of those
cases, the court was obliged to determine whether it was the statute or the rule that
was unconstitutional under Art. IV, § 5(B).57
Why the difference between the federal experience and Ohio’s? The difference
stems from one vastly important distinction between the federal Rules Enabling Act
and Ohio’s Modern Courts Amendment. The Enabling Act is an act of Congress; it is
legislation.58 In it, Congress delegated rulemaking authority to the Supreme Court.59
The Modern Courts Amendment, however, is a constitutional provision. 60 It lodges the
authority to prescribe “rules governing practice and procedure”—an area over which
the General Assembly theretofore had legislative authority61—in the Supreme Court
of Ohio as a matter of constitutional allocation, not by delegation through legislative

53

See id. at 326.

54

Cf. William W. Milligan & James E. Pohlman, The 1968 Modern Courts Amendment to
the Ohio Constitution, 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 811, 829 (1968).
55

See generally Carrington, note 50, at 322–26.

56

See infra note 81 and accompanying text.

57

Id.

58

Rules Enabling Act of 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2071 (2017)).
59

Id.

60

OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B).

61

Milligan & Pohlman, supra note 54, at 829 (“Prior to this constitutional amendment,
practice and procedure in Ohio have been governed by statute”); see also Blackmore II, supra
note 3; cf. Morrison v. Steiner, 290 N.E.2d 841, 843 (Ohio 1972) (“Venue is a procedural matter.
Although once the private domain of the General Assembly, it is now properly within the rulemaking power of the [Ohio] Supreme Court under Section 5(B), Article IV of the Constitution
of Ohio”).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2017

11

80

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:69

authority.62 Constitutional allocation implicates the checks-and-balances aspect of the
separation-of-powers doctrine; delegation does not. 63
Unfortunately for Ohio, the presumed dichotomy between substance and
procedure provides little analytical assistance in defining the difference in areas of
legislative and court rulemaking authority.64 Moreover, the distinction between
delegated authority and constitutional allocation was not fully appreciated when Ohio
adopted the Modern Courts Amendment.65 These combined facts make the silence in
Art. IV, § 5(B) far more significant in Ohio than the same silence in the federal system.
62 See generally STEPHEN H. STEINGLASS & GINO J. SCARSELLI, THE OHIO STATE
CONSTITUTION 65 (2011) (stating that the Modern Courts Amendment’s grant of authority to
the court “differs from the federal system in which the U.S. Supreme Court derives its rulemaking authority from . . . the Rules Enabling Act, rather than directly from the federal
constitution”).
63

See id.

64 Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking ‘Substantive Rights’ (in the Rules Enabling Act) More
Seriously, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 47, 69–70 (1998) (“The precise boundaries of purely
procedural matters are . . . of little practical significance for a separation of powers analysis.”).
See also Young, supra note 3, at 2.16–2.17.
65

Cf. Milligan & Pohlman, supra note 54. A study of law reviews published since 1969
that discussed adoption of the Modern Courts Amendment revealed no discussion of the
dissimilar sources of the court’s rulemaking power.
Ohio’s selection of the Rules Enabling Act as the model on which to ground its venture into
court lawmaking may not have been the wisest. The Enabling Act model brought with it
interpretive problems that have remained intractable.
To this day, no real consensus has developed as to how the Act should be interpreted.
....
The principal reason why construction of the Rules Enabling Act has eluded anything
approaching consensus lies in the two key sections of the Act. One section requires the
rulemakers “to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure . . . . The other
operative provision specifies that rulemaking under the Act “shall not abridge, enlarge
or modify any substantive right.” The question is, how should the two sections be
construed when taken together? What distinguishes a permissible rule from an
impermissible one?
....
[T]he last seventy years of doctrine and scholarship have failed to produce a generally
accepted construction of the procedural-substantive interplay of the Act’s two key
provisions.
Martin H. Redish & Dennis Murashko, The Rules Enabling Act and the Procedural-Substantive
Tension: A Lesson in Statutory Interpretation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 26, 27–31 (2008).
On a more fundamental level, the context in which the federal Rules Enabling Act was enacted
was fundamentally different from the context to which the drafters of the Modern Courts
Amendment wished to apply the structure and content that they lifted from the federal Rules
Enabling Act. The federal Act arose out of a decades-long movement to create a uniform set of
rules applicable in all federal district courts across the country. The most potent and fundamental
problem that the movement faced was achieving a uniformity that was workable in all cases that
were controlled by the Rules of Decision Act of 1789, i.e., in both federal-question cases and
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IV. “SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT” VERSUS “PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE”
In both the federal and Ohio systems for allocating rulemaking authority, the
allocation between court and legislature turns on the distinction between a
“substantive right” and “practice and procedure.”66 The distinction is inherently
vague,67 notoriously difficult to define in the abstract, and even harder to apply.68 As
a result, its utility as the sole criterion for marking the constitutional boundary between
legislative and judicial domains is functionally nil.
For the purpose of defining the Court’s rulemaking authority under the federal
Rules Enabling Act, the United States Supreme Court has essentially given up trying
to ascribe any predictive, consistent distinction between substance and procedure. In
Hanna v. Plumer,69 the Court acknowledged that substance and procedure sometimes
mean different things in different contexts and that they sometimes overlap.70 Faced
with having to determine whether a court-promulgated rule is procedural for purposes
of the Rules Enabling Act, the Court devised a way to avoid the issue.71 The Court
created a presumption that every rule that it successfully promulgates is procedural
because, to have become effective, the rule had to pass through the process established
by Congress in the Rules Enabling Act. This process included Congress’s review and,
diversity cases. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 29, at 1159 n.620; Carrington, supra note 50,
passim; John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693 passim (1974);
Kelleher, supra note 64, passim.
In Ohio, by contrast, the fundamental problem was to lay out a workable reallocation of
lawmaking between the supreme court and the General Assembly, i.e., separation of powers.
The fact that Ohio’s model was fashioned for a distinctly different problem has made more
difficult Ohio’s effort to make sense of cases decided since 1934 under the federal Act.
66

Redish & Murashko, supra note 65, at 27.

67

“A word or phrase is . . . vague when the concept to which it unquestionably refers has
uncertain application to various factual situations.” ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER,
READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 32 (2012) (citing E. Allan Farnsworth,
Some Considerations in the Drafting of Agreements, in DRAFTING CONTRACTS AND
COMMERCIAL INSTRUMENTS 145, 146–47 (1971) (“A word that may or may not be applicable to
marginal objects is vague”)); see also REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 48–
49 (1975) (“[V]agueness refers to the degree to which, independently of equivocation, language
is uncertain in its respective applications to a number of particulars”); LINDA D. JELLUM,
MASTERING STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 70 (2008) (noting that although “ambiguity is not the
same as generalness, . . . judges routinely say that language is ambiguous when it is merely
vague, broad, or general”).
68 Walter Wheeler Cook’s transformative article on the nonpredictive quality of the terms
“substance” and “procedure” in legal analysis was published in 1933. Walter Wheeler Cook,
‘Substance’ and ‘Procedure’ in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333, 336 n.10 (1933) (“The
distinction between substantive and procedural law is artificial and illusory. In essence, there is
none.”). For the importance of Cook’s work and its role in the debates over the appropriateness
of specific Rules proposed by the United States Supreme Court, see Burbank, supra note 29, at
1159 n.620.
69

Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).

70

Id. at 471.

71

Id. at 461.
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eventually, its rejection of the rule or acquiescence in its adoption.72 As the Court later
explained in Burlington Northern v. Woods,73
the study and approval given each proposed Rule by the Advisory
Committee, the Judicial Conference, and this Court, and the statutory
requirement that the Rule be reported to Congress for a period of review
before taking effect . . . give the Rules presumptive validity under both the
constitutional and statutory constraints.74
The presumption allows the Court to pass over the mystic distinction between
substance and procedure as the determinant of whether authority to address a matter
is judicial or legislative.75 By focusing on the process for promulgating a rule rather
than on the nature of the matter addressed in it, a rule sometimes satisfies muster under
Hanna even though, for some purposes, the rule is substantive, not procedural.76 The
factors that, according to the Supreme Court, give rise to the presumption will be
discussed further infra.77
Soon after the Modern Courts Amendment was adopted, the Supreme Court of
Ohio itself recognized that the supposed substance/procedure dichotomy is bankrupt.
In Gregory v. Flowers, the court observed that:
[t]he distinction between substantive and procedural law is artificial and
illusory. In essence, there is none. The remedy and the predetermined
machinery, so far as the litigant has a recognized claim to use it, are legally
speaking, part of the right itself. A right without a remedy for its violation
is a command without a sanction . . . i.e., no law at all. While it may be
convenient to distinguish between the right or liability, the remedy or
penalty by which it is enforced, on the one hand, and the machinery by
which the remedy is applied to the right, on the other, i.e., between
substantive law and procedural law, it should not be forgotten that so far as
either is law at all, it is the litigant’s right to insist upon it, i.e., it is part of
his right. In other words, it is substantive law. 78
Despite recognizing the futility of trying to ascribe any mutually exclusive distinction
between “substantive” and “procedural”—even though the United States Supreme
Court gave up attempting to separate substance and procedure into mutually exclusive
72

Id.

73

Burlington Northern v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1 (1987) (citing Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471).

74

Id. at 6.

75

Id.

76 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468 (“The difference between the conclusion that the Massachusetts
rule is applicable, and the conclusion that it is not, is of course at this point ‘outcomedeterminative’ in the sense that if we hold the state rule to apply, respondent prevails, whereas
if we hold that Rule 4 (d)(1) governs, the litigation will continue. But in this sense every
procedural variation is ‘outcome-determinative.’”).
77

See infra Part V.

78

Gregory v. Flowers, 290 N.E.2d 181, 186 (Ohio 1972) (quoting 1 CHARLES FREDERIC
CHAMBERLAYNE, A TREATISE ON THE MODERN LAW OF EVIDENCE 217 (1911)).
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categories for purposes of allocating lawmaking authority—the Supreme Court of
Ohio routinely struggles with this dichotomy.79 The issue arises whenever the court is
asked to decide which branch of Ohio government has the constitutionally allocated
authority to prescribe rules affecting practice or procedure in instances where both
have attempted to do so.80
Since 1968, the Supreme Court of Ohio has been faced with explicating the
allocation of legislative authority no less than thirty-six times.81 As will be discussed

79

See infra note 81.

80

Id.

81

Each of the cases decided by the supreme court addresses—to a greater or lesser extent—
the same two fundamental components of the lawmaking authority under OHIO CONST. art. IV,
§ 5(B): (1) whether the statute and rule conflict and (2) whether the subject matter of the statute
and court rule substantive or procedural. The court’s handling of the substance-procedure issue
in those cases falls into roughly five categories:
(1) Court found no conflict between a court-promulgated rule and a statute. See State ex rel.
Sapp. v. Franklin Cty. Court of Appeals, 889 N.E.2d 500 (Ohio 2008); State ex rel. Boylen v.
Harmon, 839 N.E.2d 934 (Ohio 2006); State ex rel. Thompson v. Spon, 700 N.E.2d 1281 (Ohio
1998); State ex rel. Steckman v. Jackson, 639 N.E.2d 83 (Ohio 1994); State ex rel. Beacon J.
Publ’g Co. v. Waters, 617 N.E.2d 1110 (Ohio 1993); Ky. Oaks Mall Co. v. Mitchell’s Formal
Wear, Inc., 559 N.E.2d 477 (Ohio 1990); State v. Brown, 528 N.E.2d 523 (Ohio 1988); State v.
Slatter, 423 N.E.2d 100 (Ohio 1981).
(2) Court found a conflict between a rule and a statute, and resolved in favor of one or the other,
but did not attempt to explicate the difference between “practice and procedure” and a
“substantive right” as applied to the case. See Proctor v. Kardassilaris, 873 N.E.2d 872 (Ohio
2007); Hiatt v. S. Health Facilities, 626 N.E.2d 71 (Ohio 1994); In re Coy, 616 N.E.2d 1105
(Ohio 1993); State ex rel. Hurt v. Kistler, 587 N.E.2d 298 (Ohio 1992); State v. Smorgala, 553
N.E.2d 672 (Ohio 1990); State ex rel. Clark v. Toledo, 560 N.E.2d 1313 (Ohio 1990); State v.
Rahman, 492 N.E.2d 401 (Ohio 1986); Alexander v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co., 359 N.E.2d 702
(Ohio 1977); Boyer v. Boyer, 346 N.E.2d 286 (Ohio 1976); City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Bowers,
459 N.E.2d 532 (Ohio 1979).
(3) Court found a conflict between a rule and a statute, attempted to define the difference
between “practice and procedure” and a “substantive right” as applied to the case, and ruled that
the statute prevails because a court-promulgated Rule cannot modify a substantive right. See
Havel v. Villa St. Joseph, 963 N.E.2d 1270 (Ohio 2012); Erwin v. Bryan, 929 N.E.2d 1019
(Ohio 2010); State ex rel. Loyd v. Lovelady, 840 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 2006); Hartsock v.
Chrysler Corp., 541 N.E.2d 1037 (Ohio 1989) (jurisdictional case); Malloy v. Westlake, 370
N.E.2d 457 (Ohio 1977) (jurisdictional case); State v. Hughes, 324 N.E.2d 731 (Ohio 1975)
(jurisdictional case); Krause v. State, 285 N.E.2d 736 (Ohio 1972) (no statute at issue in the
case).
(4) Court found a conflict, attempted to define the difference between a rule and a statute,
attempted to define the difference between “practice and procedure” and a “substantive right”
as applied to the case, and ruled that the court-promulgated rule prevails because the statute is
procedural and, therefore, either was repealed by Art. IV, § 5(B) or violates it. See Rockey v.
84 Lumber Co., 611 N.E.2d 789 (Ohio 1993); State ex rel. Silcott v. Spahr, 552 N.E.2d 926
(Ohio 1990); State v. Greer, 530 N.E.2d 382 (Ohio 1988); State v. Rahman, 492 N.E.2d 401
(Ohio 1986); Johnson v. Porter, 471 N.E.2d 484 (Ohio 1984); State ex rel. Columbus v.
Boyland, 391 N.E.2d 324 (Ohio 1979).
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in section VI, the Supreme Court of Ohio does not have the option to bypass the
substance/procedure dichotomy the way the United States Supreme Court did in
Hanna and Burlington Northern. Ohio cannot rely on the presumption that, if a matter
is addressed in a court-promulgated rule, the matter is procedural.
V. CONGRESS AND THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
“Nothing could be clearer from the pre-1934 history of the Rules Enabling Act
than that the procedure/substance dichotomy . . . was intended to allocate lawmaking
power between the Supreme Court as rulemaker and Congress.” 82 The United States
Supreme Court has consistently recognized that its power to promulgate rules of
practice and procedure is a power that Congress delegated to it through the federal
Rules Enabling Act of 1934 and various parallel legislation. 83 The United States
Supreme Court has authority to promulgate rules, therefore, only to the extent that and
only so long as it possesses the authority that Congress delegated to it.84
If Congress and the Supreme Court disagree about a proposed rule of practice and
procedure, Congress has several ways of addressing the disagreement. Congress can
postpone the effective date of the proposed rule.85 Or Congress can rescind or modify

(5) The court, without further defining the difference between “practice and procedure” and a
“substantive right,” applied the ruling of a case listed in (2) or (3) above. See Flynn v. Fairview
Vill. Ret. Cmty. Ltd., 970 N.E.2d 927 (Ohio 2012); Myers v. Brown, 967 N.E.2d 1212 (Ohio
2012); Seger v. For Women, Inc., 854 N.E.2d 188 (Ohio 2006); State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial
Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 1999); State ex rel. Bohlman v. O’Donnell, 628
N.E.2d 1367 (Ohio 1994); Stark v. Arn, 613 N.E.2d 167 (Ohio 1993).
82

Burbank, supra note 29, at 1106.

83

Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9–10, 15 (1941) (“Congress has undoubted power
to regulate the practice and procedure of federal courts, and may exercise that power by
delegating to this or other federal courts authority to make rules not inconsistent with the statutes
or constitution of the United States . . . . The value of the reservation of the power to examine
proposed rules, laws and regulations before they become effective is well understood by
Congress. It is frequently, as here, employed to make sure that the action under the delegation
squares with the Congressional purpose. Evidently the Congress felt the rule was within the
ambit of the statute as no effort was made to eliminate it from the proposed body of rules . . . .”)
(internal citations omitted); see also Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins., 559
U.S. 393, 406–07 (2010) (“In the Rules Enabling Act, Congress authorized this Court to
promulgate rules of procedure subject to its review, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) . . . .”); Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471–74 (1965) (“In the Rules Enabling Act, Congress authorized this
Court to prescribe uniform Rules to govern the ‘practice and procedure’ of the federal district
courts and courts of appeals.”).
84

Hanna, 380 U.S. at 473.

85 See, e.g., Act of March 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9. The title of the Act, an
“Act to promote the separation of constitutional powers,” indicates Congress’s concern that the
Court had overstepped its constitutional and statutory rulemaking authority. Kelleher, supra
note 64.

By 1979, the tactic of postponing the effective date of proposed amendments to Federal Rules
had ceased to be “a novel procedure.” 125 CONG. REC. H6376 (daily ed. July 23, 1979)
(statement of Rep. Drinan); see generally Arthur J. Goldberg, The Constitutional Doctrine of
Separation of Powers, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 667, 668 (1973) (“[T]he rules enabling acts have
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the Rules Enabling Act by which Congress delegated rulemaking authority to the
Court. Or Congress can amend the rule that the Court submitted to Congress. 86 Or
Congress can assume legislative authority over the subject and enact legislation in
substitution for the proposed rule.87 Finally, even after a rule proposed by the Supreme
Court becomes law, Congress can pass legislation changing what the Supreme Court
promulgated through its rulemaking authority.88 Congress has exercised each of these
options at one time or another regarding the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 89 and
Criminal Procedure.90
Congress’s most assertive action against rules that the United States Supreme
Court proposed, however, involved the Federal Rules of Evidence, which the Court
first proposed in 1972.91 Both houses of Congress introduced bills to postpone the
effective date that the Supreme Court had set for the proposed Rules, thereby giving
Congress time to examine the Court’s view of its claimed authority to promulgate
evidence rules.92 As the postponed effective date approached, Congress enacted a bill
that prohibited the Supreme Court’s proposed rules from taking effect. Declaring that
rules of evidence were not matters of “practice and procedure” and, thus, not a proper
subject for court rulemaking, Congress prohibited adoption of rules of evidence except
and until they might be “expressly approved by Act of Congress.” 93 Ultimately, the
been construed by both Congress and the Supreme Court to mean that Congress has the power
to amend or veto rules transmitted by the Chief Justice.”).
86 See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 400 (“Congress . . . has ultimate authority over the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure; it can create exceptions to an individual rule as it sees fit—either by
directly amending the rule or by enacting a separate statute overriding it in certain instances”);
cf. Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 668 (1996).
87 Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 400. Congress did precisely this when the U.S. Supreme Court
attempted to propose the Federal Rules of Evidence as rules of practice and procedure under the
federal Rules Enabling Act. See Act of January 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926; see
generally 21 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, EVIDENCE § 5006 (2005).
88

Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 400.

89

For example, in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L.
No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737, Congress established pleading standards in private securities
litigation that differed from FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights,
Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313–14 (2007) (“As a check against abusive litigation by private parties,
Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 . . . . (PSLRA), 109 Stat.
737. . . . As set out in § 21D(b)(2) of the PSLRA, plaintiffs must ‘state with particularity facts
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.’”).
90 For example, Congress amended Rule 6(e)(3)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure in the Homeland Security Act of 2002. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, tit. VIII, § 895 (2002) (amending FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)).
91

Paul F. Rothstein, The Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 GEO.
L.J. 125, 125 (1973).
92 119 CONG. REC. 2395–96 (1973) (Senate); 119 CONG. REC. 3739, 3749 (1973) (House
of Representatives).
93 Act of March 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9 (“Be it enacted . . . [t]hat
notwithstanding any other provisions of law, the Rules of Evidence for United States Courts
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Federal Rules of Evidence became law as a statute enacted through an Act of
Congress, not as rules of practice and procedure promulgated by the Supreme Court
under its authority in the federal Rules Enabling Act.94
The number and extent of Congress’s various options for dealing with proposed
rules exist as attributes that flow from the foundational fact that Congress delegated
the authority the Court exercises.95
VI. GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
In contrast to Congress’s ranging authority to participate in the process of court
rulemaking, the sole function that Art. IV, § 5(B) recognizes for the General Assembly
regarding the court’s rulemaking authority is the power to disapprove rules of practice
or procedure within a prescribed period after they are proposed.96 If the General
Assembly is to act at all regarding a proposed rule, it must do so by adopting a
concurrent resolution of disapproval by June 30 of the year in which the court
submitted the proposal to the legislature for review. 97 Unless both houses of the
General Assembly concur in the resolution, the proposed rule becomes law by
default.98
The surprising history of the Ohio Rules of Evidence demonstrates how fleeting
and fragile the power to disapprove can be, lodged as it is in a multi-layered,
intentionally slow-acting, and easily stalled General Assembly.
A.

The Strange and Revealing History of the Ohio Rules of Evidence

As discussed above, the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence became the reagent
for analyzing the respective roles of Congress and the United States Supreme Court in
rulemaking. The Supreme Court of Ohio’s proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence had a
similar effect. The debates that erupted over the proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence—
which are remembered as the Ohio Evidence War—brought into high relief the
uncertainty inherent in the false dichotomy between substance and procedure and,
thus, the confusion over what is properly within the legislative domains of court and
legislature.99 The conflict that ensued also demonstrated the impotence of a concurrent
resolution as the only check on the Supreme Court of Ohio’s rulemaking power.100

and Magistrates . . . shall have no force or effect except to the extent, and with such
amendments, as they may be expressly approved by Act of Congress.”).
94
Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926. For a summary of Congress’s
unusually assertive involvement in the eventual Federal Rules of Evidence, see 21 WRIGHT &
GRAHAM, JR., supra note 87.
95

Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9 (1941).

96

OHIO CONST. art IV, § 5(B).

97

Id.

98

Id.

99

See Act of January 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat 1926.

100

Id.
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The first version of the Proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence was published for review
and public comment on February 21, 1977.101 A substantially different version
eventually became law three years later on July 1, 1980. During the intervening years,
however, the General Assembly acted as assertively in reacting to the proposed Ohio
Rules of Evidence as Congress had acted in response to the proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence.
As originally proposed, the Ohio Rules of Evidence were modeled very closely
after the Federal Rules.102 They were so closely modeled that, for example, they would
have made evidence law in Ohio subject to change by Congress. 103 The Office of Ohio
Attorney General William J. Brown was the only party to publicly urge rejection of
the proposed Rules.104 Nevertheless, on recommendation from the Joint Committee of
the House and Senate Judiciary Committees,105 the General Assembly by unanimous
votes in both houses adopted a Concurrent Resolution of Disapproval.106 Among
several reasons for its opposition, the General Assembly was concerned that codified
evidence rules—at least those patterned after the Federal Rules—would affect
substantive rights and, to that extent, were not properly within the court’s
constitutional authority to prescribe rules under Art. IV, § 5(B).107
Shortly after rejecting the Rules of Evidence, the General Assembly adopted
another resolution, Amended Senate Joint Resolution 25.108 The resolution created a
joint select committee that was to study the proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence and
101

Proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence, 50 OHIO B. 231 (1977).

102

Id.

103 For example, Proposed Ohio Evidence Rule 402 stated, “[a]ll relevant evidence is
admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by the
Constitution of the State of Ohio, by Act of Congress, by statute enacted by the General
Assembly not in conflict with an existing rule of the Supreme Court of Ohio, by these rules, or
by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court of Ohio. Evidence which is not relevant is not
admissible.” Id. at 235–36 (emphasis added). Also, Proposed Ohio Evidence Rule 802 stated,
“[h]earsay is not admissible except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United
States, by the Constitution of the State of Ohio, by Act of Congress.” Id. at 246 (emphasis
added).
104

See Proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence, supra note 101, at 231–57.

105 JOINT SUBCOMM. TO THE HOUSE AND SENATE JUDICIARY COMMS., REPORT ON THE
PROPOSED OHIO RULES OF EVIDENCE, 112th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 1 (1977-78), reprinted in
Richard S. Walinski & Howard Abramoff, Proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence: The Case Against,
28 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 344, 393 app. C (1978). Members of the Joint Subcommittee were
Senators Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr. (D.–Cleveland); Michael Schwarzwalder (D.–Columbus),
Stanley J. Aronoff (R.—Cincinnati); and Representatives Paul Leonard (D.–Dayton); Terry
Tranter (D.–Cincinnati); and William Batchelder (R.–Medina). Id. at 348 n.21; see also
Proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence, supra note 101, at 231.
106 Am. H. Con. Res. 14, 112th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (1977-78), reprinted in Walinski
& Abramoff, supra note 105, at 388 app. A [hereinafter Resolution 14].
107

Id.; see also Walinski & Abramoff, supra note 105, at 347–49, 388 app. A, 393 app. C.

108 Am. S.J. Res. 25, 112th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (1977-78), reprinted in Walinski &
Abramoff, supra note 105, at 390 app. B; see also Walinski & Abramoff, supra note 105, at
349, 355.
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evidence-reform generally.109 The General Assembly’s Concurrent Resolution stated:
“Congress of the United States has already considered the subject of codification of
the law of evidence and determined that . . . codification is the proper function of the
legislative rather than the judicial branch of government.”110
In 1978, the court proposed an identical version of the Ohio Rules of Evidence. 111
The result in 1978 was the same as in 1977: unanimous disapproval in both houses.112
In 1978, however, wide opposition to court-adopted evidence rules patterned after the
federal rules emerged.113 In addition to the Attorney General’s Office, opposition to
the Proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence came from the Ohio Association of Prosecuting
Attorneys, the Ohio Public Defenders Association, the Ohio Academy of Trial
Lawyers, the Ohio Defense Association, the Ohio State Bar Association’s Negligence
Law Committee, as well as various major law firms and individual practitioners in the
state.114
In 1979, the court submitted nothing.115 But the House took the initiative by
introducing H.B. 684.116 The bill proposed a statutory code of evidence that, as
introduced, was identical in all material respects to what the supreme court had
proposed in 1977 and 1978.117 Representative Terry M. Tranter’s purpose in
introducing the bill was to stake out for the General Assembly the same legislative
authority over the eventual Ohio Rules of Evidence that Congress had preserved for
itself by enacting the Federal Rules of Evidence by statute.118
In 1980, the Supreme Court of Ohio forced the constitutional issue that had first
emerged in 1977: whether it or the General Assembly had authority to write evidence
109

Walinski & Abramoff, supra note 105, at 390 app. B.

110

Id. Highly respected sources in Ohio warned of the uncertainty that surrounded the
Supreme Court of Ohio’s claimed authority to promulgate rules of evidence under the Modern
Courts Amendment. In 1978, James L. Young wrote that, because the court’s authority to
promulgate rules turned on the distinction between substance and procedure, the Modern Courts
Amendment, could not answer whether rules of evidence were in the province of the General
Assembly or the supreme court. He said that Art. IV, § 5(B) leaves unanswered where
rulemaking authority ultimately lies because “that question is the distinction between procedure
and substance and in the law of evidence it is a question not easily answered.” Young, supra
note 3, at 2.17.
111

Proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence, 51 OHIO B. 181 (1978).

112

H. Con. Res. 43, 112th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (1977-78).

113

Hon. William J. Brown & Richard S. Walinski, Ohio Rules of Evidence: An Open Letter
to the Bar of Ohio, 51 OHIO B. 1637 (1978).
114 For additional information about the process that produced the 1977 and 1978 Proposed
Ohio Rules of Evidence as well as about the legislature’s disapproval of both proposals, see
Parness & Manthey, supra note 3. See also PAUL C. GIANNELLI, EVIDENCE 4–5 (2010).
115

GIANNELLI, supra note 114, at 5.

116

H.B. 684, 113th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (1979-80) (“To enact sections 2318.01 to
2318.58 of the Revised Code to establish comprehensive statutory rules of evidence.”).
117

Walinski & Abramoff, supra note 105, at 389.

118

Letter from Richard S. Walinski to A. Michael Knapp, Chair, Ohio B. Comm. on Judicial
Admin. & Legal Reform (July 27, 1979) (on file with authors).
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law.119 The Court again filed a set of proposed evidence rules.120 The 1980 version was
partially rewritten121 to address some of the objections previously voiced against the
Rules proposed in 1977 and 1978.122
A joint committee of the House and Senate altered its schedule and began lengthy
hearings on the court’s 1980 proposal, enlisting a group of consultants to assist in the
study. 123 As the joint committee completed its review of an article in the court’s
proposed rules, the committee sent the court requests for revisions of specific rules.124
Initially, the court approved the requested changes.125 It accepted, for example, a
change in Rule 102 that affected how all of the Ohio Rules of Evidence are to be
interpreted.126 The court accepted the General Assembly’s suggestion that the Ohio
Rules be interpreted in a way diametrically opposite from the way the federal
counterpart to Rule 102 establishes for interpretation of the federal evidence rules. 127
As May 1st approached, however, the court stopped accepting changes
recommended by the legislature.128 By mid-April, members of the select committee
recognized that their review of the proposed rules could not be completed by May 1,
the final date set in Art. IV, § 5(B) for the court to submit amendments to proposed
rules.129 The committee had not, for example, begun its review of Article VII (Lay and

119

Proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence, 53 OHIO B. 203 (1980).

120

Id. at 203–27.

121

See Walter J. Blakely, A Short Introduction to the Ohio Rules of Evidence, 10 CAP. U. L.
REV. 237, 242 (1980) (noting that the Supreme Court of Ohio filed a substantially revised draft
of proposed Rules of Evidence in 1980).
122 See id. (stating that the revisions were made to meet criticisms of the initially proposed
drafts that appeared in publications and that were voiced at previous hearings before the General
Assembly). See, e.g., ‘LEGIS-letter’: State House Matters, 52 OHIO B. 1904 (1979).
123 Consultants in favor of the proposed Rules included James L. Young, Executive Director
of the Ohio Legal Center Institute, and Paul C. Giannelli, professor at Case-Western Reserve
School of Law. Consultants opposing the proposed Rules included John E. Martindale of Arter
& Hadden and Richard S. Walinski of Cooper & Walinski. ‘LEGIS-letter’: State House Matters,
supra note 118, at 1904.
124

Id.

125

Amendments to Proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence, 53 OHIO B. 856–57 (1980). See also
Blakely, supra note 121 (noting that the court accepted the General Assembly’s
recommendations to change portions of the rules proposed in 1980).
126

Blakely, supra note 121, at 245.

127 At the request of the General Assembly in 1980, the Supreme Court of Ohio changed
OHIO EVID. R. 102 to provide “that the rules shall be construed to state the common law of Ohio
unless the rules clearly indicate that a change is intended.” Ohio Rules of Evidence, 53 OHIO B.
1197, 1198 (1980). In accepting the requested change, the court deleted from its proposed Rule
language that still appears in FED. R. EVID. 102: “These rules should be construed so as to . . .
promote the development of evidence law . . . .” Id.
128

See id.

129

Id.
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Expert Opinions) or Article VIII (Hearsay). 130 The Senate, therefore, introduced yet
another concurrent resolution of disapproval.131 Once again, the Senate passed the
Resolution unanimously.132
The Resolution was sent to the House for concurrence and was referred to the
House Judiciary Committee.133 Chairman Harry J. Lehman refused, however, to place
the Resolution on the committee’s agenda.134
As June 30th approached, a group of representatives attempted to force the Senate
Resolution out of the Judiciary Committee. 135 For parliamentary reasons, the effort
failed.136 Because the Senate Resolution remained stuck in the House Judiciary
Committee, the House failed to concur in the Senate’s unanimous disapproval of the
court’s evidence rules.137
The unfinished revision of the Ohio Rules of Evidence became law on July 1, 1980
for want of the House of Representatives’ concurrence in the Senate’s unanimously
adopted Resolution of Disapproval.138 The Rules of Evidence had not received a single
legislator’s vote of approval in either house of the General Assembly in the fours year
after their first promulgation. 139 Moreover, the successive, unanimous disapprovals
were clear statements that the General Assembly agreed with Congress about the
nature of evidence law; rules of evidence were not matters of “practice and procedure”
and thus are not within the supreme court’s power under Art. IV, § 5(B) to address in
court-made rules.140
B.

The Role of the General Assembly on Matters of “Practice and Procedure”

The General Assembly’s options beyond adopting a concurrent resolution of
disapproval are far from clear. As noted previously, Art. IV, § 5(B) itself is silent about
whether the General Assembly may, to any extent, continue to legislate on a matter
“governing practice and procedure” once the court promulgates a rule on the matter.141
Despite the Ohio Constitution’s silence, the General Assembly has continued to
enact statutes that purport to alter procedures that have already been addressed in
court-promulgated rules.142 Because of this persistent legislative activity, dozens of
130

Id.

131

S.J. Res. 22, 113th Gen. Assemb., Sess. 2 (1979-80).

132

See S.J. Res. 22, 1980 Ohio Legis. Bull. 148 (1980).

133

Id.

134

Id.

135

Id.

136

Id.

137

Id.

138

Id.

139

Id.

140

Id.

141

See OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B).

142

See id. art. II, § 1.
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cases came before the Supreme Court of Ohio in which it had to decide (a) whether a
statute and a court-promulgated rule were in conflict and (b) if so, whether the point
of conflict was a matter of substance or procedure.143 Although the court has been
confronted with the substance/procedure dualism many times, the court has shed very
little light on what precisely the distinction denotes.144 Except in cases involving a few
topics that settled Ohio law considers substantive—viz., subject-matter jurisdiction,
statutes of limitation, evidentiary privileges, constitutionally protected rights, etc.—
the court has attempted in only a few cases to explain the difference between “a
substantive right” and a rule of “practice and procedure.”145
Beginning in 1979, two distinct rules of law have emerged from these few cases.
They provide diametrically opposite interpretations of the General Assembly’s power
under Art. IV, § 5(B). One line holds that, after the court has promulgated a rule on
the matter, Art. IV, § 5(B) prohibits the General Assembly from thereafter legislating
on the matter.146 The other holds precisely the opposite: the General Assembly may
legislate on a matter of practice or procedure even after the court has promulgated a
rule on the matter.147
The rules of law established and followed in these two lines cannot both be correct.
Both lines of cases, however, remain definitive holdings by the Supreme Court of Ohio
according to its own rules regarding the precedential value of its opinions. 148
143

See, e.g., State ex rel. Loyd v. Lovelady, 840 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 2006); Rockey v. 84
Lumber Co., 611 N.E.2d 789 (Ohio 1993).
144 See GIANNELLI supra note 114, at 47 (“The Ohio cases interpreting the terms ‘substance’
and ‘procedure’ in the context of the Ohio Constitution, Article IV, § 5(B) provided little
guidance. Most of these cases simply categorize a rule or statute as substantive or procedural,
giving little or no explanation for the choice of label”).
145 Havel v. Villa St. Joseph, 963 N.E.2d 1270 (Ohio 2012); Lovelady, 840 N.E.2d at 1062;
State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 1999); Rockey,
611 N.E.2d at 789; State v. Greer, 530 N.E.2d 382 (Ohio 1988); State v. Rahman, 492 N.E.2d
401 (Ohio 1986); Johnson v. Porter, 471 N.E.2d 484 (Ohio 1984); State ex rel. Columbus v.
Boyland, 391 N.E.2d 324 (Ohio 1979).
146

See e.g., Rockey, 611 N.E.2d at 789.

147

See e.g., Havel, 963 N.E.2d at 1270; Lovelady, 840 N.E.2d at 1062.

148

Opinions that the Supreme Court of Ohio issued from 1858 until May 1, 2002 had
varying precedential value, depending on whether the opinion was per curiam or signed and, if
signed, whether the court authored a syllabus in the decision. If the majority opinion was signed,
the precedential value of the signed opinion depended on whether the court issued a syllabus to
the opinion. If the court authored a syllabus, it was the syllabus—not the signed opinion—that
stated the points of law established by the ruling. Unless and until the syllabus has been
overruled, the proposition remains controlling law in Ohio. Compare State v. Wilson, 388
N.E.2d 745, 751 (Ohio 1979) (“The law in Ohio since 1858 has been that it is the syllabus of
the Supreme Court decisions which states the law, i.e., the points of law decided in a case are
to be found in the syllabus. Therefore, where the justice assigned to write the opinion discusses
matters or expresses his opinion on questions not in the syllabus, the language is merely the
personal opinion of the writer.”) with SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, SUPREME COURT RULES FOR
THE REPORTING OF OPINIONS § 2.0, Rule 1(B) (2002) (stating that the law announced in an
opinion of the Supreme Court of Ohio appears on the syllabus, text, and footnotes of the
opinion). Furthermore, in the Sixth Circuit, the court held that “[a] per curiam opinion is entitled
to the same weight as a syllabus in stating the law.” Truesdale v. Dallman, 690 F.2d 76, 77 n.1
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Rockey v. 84 Lumber

The Supreme Court of Ohio gave its clearest statement of the rule recognized in
the first line of cases in Rockey v. 84 Lumber.149 In that case, the court considered a
conflict between Civil Rule 8(A), which required a plaintiff to plead the amount of
actual damages sought, and a statute that the General Assembly enacted after adoption
of that rule.150 The statute prohibited a plaintiff from alleging the amount of actual
damages if it exceeded a specified dollar amount.151
The court accepted its obligation to decide the case as one turning in the first
instance on whether the subject matter that both Rule 8(A) and the statute addressed
was substantive or procedural.152 Years earlier, in Krause v. State, the first case
decided after the Modern Courts Amendment was adopted, the court stated that
“substantive” and “procedural” in law are antonyms, albeit imperfectly so. 153 The court
said,
[t]he word “substantive,” as used in Section 5(B) of Article IV, is in
contradistinction to the words “adjective” or “procedural” which pertain to
the method of enforcing rights or obtaining redress. “Substantive” means
that body of law which creates, defines and regulates the rights of the
parties. (See Black’s Law Dictionary.) The word substantive refers to
common law, statutory and constitutionally recognized rights . . . .
[A]djective [i.e., procedural] and substantive law are not always mutually
exclusive . . . .154
In Rockey, the court declared, without explanation, that the rule and statute were
procedural.155 It did so, however, without explaining how a procedural matter is to be
distinguished from a substantive matter.
The court then passed directly to the central question about which § 5(B) is silent.
In the body of the opinion, the court stated that, because Rule 8(A) was promulgated
under the authority of Art. IV, § 5(B), the statute left the General Assembly without

(6th Cir. 1982) (citing State ex rel. Canada v. Phillips, 151 N.E.2d 722, 722 syllabus ¶ 6 (Ohio
1958)) (“Only what is stated in a syllabus or in an opinion per curiam or by the court represents
a pronouncement of law by this court.”).
149 Rockey, 611 N.E.2d, aff’d, Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers, 715 N.E.2d at 1087–88 (“The
Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, which were promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to
Section 5(B), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, must control over subsequently enacted
inconsistent statutes purporting to govern procedural matters. . . . [Citations to lower court
rulings omitted.] This interpretation is the only one consistent with the original reason for
adopting Section 5(B), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution—that of constitutionally granting
rule-making power to the Supreme Court.”).
150

Rockey, 611 N.E.2d at 791.

151

Id. at 791–92.

152

Id.

153

Krause v. State, 285 N.E.2d 736 (Ohio 1972).

154

Id. at 744.

155

Rockey, 611 N.E.2d at 791–92.
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constitutional authority to legislate in conflict with the rule.156 Without explanation,
the court simply declared that
[t]his interpretation is the only one consistent with the original reason for
adopting Section 5(B), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution—that of
constitutionally granting rule-making power to the Supreme Court.157
Syllabus two of the opinion states:
The Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, which were promulgated by the
Supreme Court pursuant to Section 5(B), Article IV of the Ohio
Constitution, must control over subsequently enacted inconsistent statutes
purporting to govern procedural matters. 158
In holding the General Assembly disenfranchised once a procedural rule takes
effect, the court expanded the effect of its own lawmaking authority beyond the plain
language of Art. IV, § 5(B).159 The court offered no textual, historical, or principled
analysis of Art. IV, § 5(B) to support disenfranchisement. 160 Instead, the court ignored
the plainly discernible meaning of the pivotal sentence discussing the effect of court156

Id.

157

Id.

158

Id. at 789.

159

Id. at 791–92.

160 The court cited four lower court decisions—two as direct authorities and two as
additional authorities—for the proposition that Art. IV, § 5(B) must necessarily be read as
providing to the supreme court such exclusive authority over matters of “practice and
procedure”; and that, once the court has duly promulgated a rule of practice and procedure, the
General Assembly is thereby no longer allowed to legislate on that matter. The two decisions
cited as direct authority were common-pleas cases. The two cited as additional authorities were
court-of-appeals cases. One of the four cases did not stand for the proposition for which it was
cited. Jacobs v. Shelly & Sands, Inc. involved previously, not subsequently, enacted
legislation—the statute was effective January 1, 1975; the court-promulgated rule was effective
July 1, 1975. Jacobs v. Shelly & Sands, Inc., 365 N.E.2d 1259 (Ohio 1975).

The other three cases simply begged the question about whether Art. IV, § 5(B) affects the
constitutionality of legislation on procedural matters enacted after the court had duly
promulgated a rule. They merely assumed the legal proposition they were asked to decide. They
all began their analyses by stating that court-promulgated rules of practice and procedure prevail
over statutes regardless of whether the statute existed at the time the court rule took effect or
was enacted after the rules had been promulgated. See In re Vickers Children, 470 N.E.2d 438,
442 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983) (stating that without legal or historical analysis that “[i]t is clear that
the Juvenile Rules . . . must control over subsequently enacted inconsistent statutes purporting
to govern procedural matters. Any other interpretation would gut Section 5(B), Article IV, of
its essential purpose, that of constitutionally granting rule-making power to the Supreme
Court.”); Simon v. St. Elizabeth Med. Ctr., 355 N.E.2d 903, 905 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976) (citing
Graley v. Satayatham, 343 N.E.2d 832 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976)) (“[T]he Civil Rules are to take
precedence over any other conflicting laws”)); Graley v. Satayatham, 343 N.E.2d at 832 (“[A]ll
laws while [sic] are attempted to be adopted thereafter and which are in conflict with the Rules
shall ‘be of no [further] force or effect’”). None of the cases, therefore, provide analytical
support for the holding in Rockey.
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promulgated rules: “All laws in conflict with such rules [of practice and procedure]
shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.”161
This text describes a constitutional mandate under which a successfully
promulgated court rule supersedes certain laws. As described in Art. IV, § 5(B), three
characteristics identify the kinds of laws that will be superseded—laws that (1) affect
matters of practice or procedure; (2) conflict with a court rule pertaining to matters of
practice or procedure; and (3) cease their efficacy after a court-promulgated rule of
practice or procedure takes effect.162 It is this last characteristic that establishes a
temporal limitation on supersession.
“Further” modifies “force and effect.” As a modifier, the phrase no further denotes
no longer; the phrase serves to narrow the laws that might otherwise be superseded. It
necessarily limits the mandated supersession to only those laws that already have some
“force or effect” because, in ordinary parlance, only laws already in force and effect
can be said to, at some point, “be of no further force or effect.” The text of Art. IV, §
5(B) says nothing about whether the force or effect of laws may be enacted after a rule
is promulgated, and, thus, says nothing about whether the General Assembly may
enact them.163
The supersession clause of Art. IV, § 5(B) would read differently if the adjective
further were not included in the phrase “no further force or effect.” If the sentence said
all laws “in conflict . . . shall be of no force or effect after such rules have taken effect,”
it would convey a far broader meaning. Without the temporal implication of further,
the third characteristic of Art. IV, § 5(B)’s mandate would address all laws that conflict
with a court rule, thereby mandating that they have “no force or effect,” regardless of
when the laws were enacted. Only by ignoring the temporal limitation in the
supersession clause can one imagine that Art. IV, § 5(B) addresses whether the
General Assembly may legislate on a matter of practice or procedure after a court rule
on the matter becomes effective.
That, however, is exactly what the Rockey court imagined. In holding that the
General Assembly is forever barred from legislating on a matter of practice or
procedure once a rule on that matter has been promulgated, the court read Art. IV, §
5(B) as if the adjective further—and the temporal restriction it denotes—were not a
part of the constitution.164
The exclusive authority over rulemaking, which Rockey established for the court,
had notable consequences. First, by eliminating any further role for the General
Assembly in writing law that affects practice or procedure, the court set Ohio apart
from the large majority of other states. On the question of whether rulemaking is
exclusively within the courts’ domain, over eighty percent of those states reserve,
either by constitution or statute, at least some authority in the legislatures to author
content in the rules of governing practice and procedure in their courts. 165
Second, when the General Assembly lost its ability to legislate on matters affecting
rules of practice and procedure, the only remaining check on the court’s authority over
161

Rockey, 611 N.E.2d at 792.

162

See OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B).

163

Id.

164

Rockey, 611 N.E.2d at 791–92.

165

See infra notes 219–23 and accompanying text.
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the content of the rules became the limitation clause in Art. IV, § 5(B): rules of practice
and procedure may “not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.” 166 That
limitation is juxtaposed in Art. IV, § 5(B) against the court’s authority over
rulemaking.167 This clause, juxtaposed against the authority granted to the court, is the
source of the competing and enduring claims between the legislature’s constitutionally
exclusive authority over substantive matters and the court’s dominion over practice
and procedure, which according to Rockey is also exclusive.168
The court’s reading of Art. IV, § 5(B)—in a way that made the constitutional
allocation of lawmaking authority turn on the substance/procedure distinction—
reflects the court’s implicit trust in the distinction. The court trusted that the distinction
provides a workable standard for deciding whether, when statute and rule conflict, the
constitutional authority over the matter lies with the General Assembly or with the
court.169 By the time the court decided Rockey, however, it was broadly accepted that
the dichotomy cannot bear that weight.170 Scholarly analyses of the distinction had
already rejected substance/procedure duality as a meaningful standard in the
rulemaking context.171 The court’s faith was also plainly at odds with what the United
States Supreme Court had concluded about the same distinction used in the federal
Rules Enabling Act.172
Nevertheless, acting on its discredited faith in the functionality of a false
dichotomy, the court created a unique role for itself in Ohio’s system of lawmaking.
The exclusivity that it found under Art. IV, § 5(B) allowed the court to operate in nearperfect autonomy to promulgate law without any offsetting balance from another
branch of government and with only the most flimsy and fleeting check—the
concurrent resolution of disapproval—on its power. According to Rockey, Art. IV, §
5(B) transferred to the court the sole authority to make positive law on matters of
practice and procedure and, yet, left to the court alone the authority to decide whether
its exercise of that authority was constitutional, i.e., truly a matter of “practice or
procedure” and not the abridgment, expansion, or modifying of “a substantive
right.”173 As Alexander Hamilton observed in the Federalist papers, this joinder of the
legislative and judicial functions in a single branch of government is a prescription for
“arbitrary control.”174
166

Rockey, 611 N.E.2d at 791–92.

167

OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B).

168

Rockey, 611 N.E.2d at 791–92.

169

Id.

170

Burbank, supra note 29, at 1136.

171

Id.

172

Id.

173

Rockey, 611 N.E.2d at 791–92.

174

THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (Alexander Hamilton) (quoting Charles-Louis de Secondat,
Baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu) (“Were the power of judging joined with the legislative,
the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would then
be the legislator.”) (emphasis added); THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (Alexander Hamilton) (“If men
were angels, no government would be necessary . . . . In framing a government which is to be
administered by men over men, a great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the
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D. The Lovelady/Havel Line of Cases
The other, comparably seminal, cases began with State ex rel. Loyd v. Lovelady,175
which the Supreme Court of Ohio decided in 2006. There, the issue was similar to that
in Rockey: an apparent conflict between a civil rule and a subsequently enacted
statute.176 Civil Rule 60(B) allowed only a limited amount of time for a party to seek
relief from the judgment because of newly discovered evidence. 177 The statute,
however, allowed a longer period in that particular kind of case.178
The court held—this time, attempting some textual analysis—that the statute
prevailed over the rule because the statute was “substantive.”179 Despite repeating that
Art. IV, § 5(B) gave the court “the exclusive authority”—a phrase that does not appear
in Art. IV, § 5(B)—over matters of practice and procedure, the court ruled that the
General Assembly may nevertheless legislate on matters of practice and procedure.180
The court stated:
Section 5(B), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution states that the Supreme
Court is vested with exclusive authority to “prescribe rules governing
practice and procedure . . . .” If the legislature intended the enactment to be
substantive, then no intrusion on this court’s exclusive authority over
procedural matters has occurred.181
This, of course, is a novel definition of the substantive/procedure dualism. It makes
the distinction turn, not on the meaning of the words substantive and procedure
themselves, but on whether the legislature intended that the procedural matter
addressed in the statute should become “a substantive right.” Before reaching for this
novel definition, the court did not consider whether Art. IV, § 5(B), because it refers
to the concept of “a substantive right,” might be read to imply the existence of the
contradistinctive concept, “a procedural right.” 182 After all, the plain language of the
Amendment limits the court’s authority to promulgate procedural rules only to the
extent that they interfere with, not all rights, but only “substantive” rights.183 Instead
of parsing out the significance of the adjective substantive modifying right, the court

government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. . . .
[E]xperience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions).
175

State ex rel. Loyd v. Lovelady, 840 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 2006).

176

Id. at 1063.

177

Id. at 1064.

178

Id.

179

Id. at 1064–65.

180

Id. at 1064.

181

Id. (emphasis added).

182

Id. at 1063.

183

Id.
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said that “a statute may create a substantive right despite being ‘packaged in
procedural wrapping.’”184
In determining whether the General Assembly intended to create a right that
supersedes a procedural rule, the court in Lovelady accepted a declaration that the
legislature included in the preamble accompanying the original legislation.185 The
court took that declaration as establishing the legislative intent that disposes of the
constitutional question. The court said:
Fortunately, we have a clear and unambiguous statement from the General
Assembly that is directly on point. . . . [The House Bill] . . . provided that
“[t]he General Assembly hereby declares that it is a
person’s . . . substantive right to obtain relief from a final judgment, court
order, or administrative determination or order that . . . requires the
person . . . to pay child support for a child.”. . . Thus, although [the statute
is] . . . necessarily packaged in procedural wrapping, it is clear to us that
the General Assembly intended to create a substantive right to address
potential injustice.186
The court decided Lovelady several years after it changed the rules for ranking the
precedential value of its decisions.187 Before 2002, it was the court’s syllabus, not the
signed opinion, that stated definitively the points of law established in the case.188 Yet,
in holding that the statute prevailed over the court-promulgated rule, the court in
Lovelady did not overrule syllabus 2 of Rockey, which held that the “Ohio Rules of
Civil Procedure . . . must control over subsequently enacted inconsistent statutes
purporting to govern procedural matters.” 189
Even though Lovelady repeats, without citation, Rockey’s holding that “practice
and procedure” are the court’s exclusive domain, the reasoning in Lovelady
nevertheless contradicts the holding in Rockey. Rockey stands for the proposition that
once the court promulgates a rule on a procedural matter, the General Assembly is
disenfranchised regarding that matter.190 Lovelady, however, stands for the proposition
that the General Assembly may legislate on matters of practice and procedure if, in
doing so, the legislature intends to create a “substantive” right regarding the
procedural matter.191

184 Havel v. Villa St. Joseph, 963 N.E.2d 1270, 1277–78 (Ohio 2012) (quoting Lovelady,
840 N.E.2d at 1064–65).
185

Lovelady, 840 N.E.2d at 1064–65.

186

Id.

187 See SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, SUPREME COURT RULES FOR THE REPORTING OF OPINIONS
§ 2.0, Rule 1(B) (2012).
188

Id.

189

Rockey v. 84 Lumber Co., 611 N.E.2d 789, 791–92 (Ohio 1993).

190

Id.

191

Lovelady, 840 N.E.2d at 1064–65.
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The court’s 2012 decision in Havel v. Villa St. Joseph192 may be slightly more
important than Lovelady—if only because the court attempted to lay a firmer
foundation for its holding in Lovelady. The Havel decision provided a different
rationale for Lovelady’s holding that the General Assembly may override a courtpromulgated procedural rule if it enacts a statute converting the procedural matter into
a procedural right.193 Once again, the court attempted to achieve that end without
overruling Rockey’s syllabus 2.194 The rationale the court adopted in Havel is even
more novel than Lovelady’s.
In Havel, the issue was similar to those in both Rockey and Lovelady. A court rule
conflicted with a subsequently enacted statute.195 Civil Rule 42(B) gave the trial court
discretion whether to bifurcate the trial of a claim for punitive damages from the trial
of the underlying liability.196 The statute, however, made bifurcation mandatory upon
the request of any party.197
Although the General Assembly had not declared explicitly (as had happened in
Lovelady) an intention to create a substantive right, the court in Havel nevertheless
held that the statute was substantive.198 The court gave three reasons. The first is
pivotal. The court attempted there to explain why the term “substantive right”
encompasses “rules governing . . . procedure.”199 The court ultimately said that every
right created by statute is, by definition, a “substantive right.”
The court’s reasoning began with a commonly cited definition of substantive. In
the two pivotal paragraphs of the decision, the court said:
[A] statute’s constitutionality depends upon whether it is a substantive or
procedural law. In Krause v. State, . . . we defined “substantive” in the
context of the constitutional amendment to mean “that body of law which
creates, defines and regulates the rights of the parties. * * * The word
substantive refers to common law, statutory and constitutionally recognized
rights.” . . . By contrast, procedural law “prescribes methods of
enforcement of rights or obtaining redress.”
A right is defined as “[a] power, privilege, or immunity secured to a person
by law,” as well as “[a] legally enforceable claim that another will do or
will not do a given act.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1436 (9th Ed. 2009).
Compare R.C. 2505.02(A)(1) (defining a “substantial right” for the purpose
of defining a final order as a “right that the United States Constitution, the
Ohio Constitution, a statute, the common law, or a rule of procedure entitles
a person to enforce or protect”). Thus, classification of R.C. 2315.21(B) as
192

Havel v. Villa St. Joseph, 963 N.E.2d 1270 (Ohio 2012).

193

Id. at 1277–78.

194

Id.

195

Id. at 1272.

196

Id.

197

Id.

198

Id.

199

Id. at 1278.
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a substantive or procedural law depends upon whether the statute creates
a right.200
Notice how in the brief span of this passage a “substantive right,” which begins as a
concept distinct from matters procedural, sheds the adjective substantive and, then,
becomes any right that is created by statute, even one that might pertain to procedural
law.
To rationalize this transformation, the court relied on a fallacious equivocation. In
construing the phrase “substantive right” as used in Art. IV, § 5(B), the court resorted
to a statutory definition for the term substantial right—a phrase that does not appear
in Art. IV, § 5(B).201 Next, the court demonstrated that the term substantial right, as
used elsewhere in Ohio law, encompasses procedural matters. 202 Then, without
explaining the relationship, if any, between substantive rights and substantial rights,
the court used the definition of substantial right to explicate the meaning of
“substantive right,” finding that as used in Art. IV, § 5(B) the term “a substantive
right” subsumes procedural matters. 203 The court’s conflating of substantive with
substantial as equivalents violates the plain meaning of the two words.204
Nothing in the plain language of Art. IV § 5(B) and nothing in the court’s prior
opinions suggests that Art. IV, § 5(B) uses the term “a substantive right” in a sense
that makes procedural matters merely a subset of substantive rights. 205 Instead, the
Supreme Court of Ohio made precisely the opposite point in Krause v. State, the first
case in which the court was required to interpret the Modern Courts Amendment. 206
The court said that “[t]he word ‘substantive,’ as used in Section 5(B) of Article IV,
contradicts the words ‘adjective’ or ‘procedural’ . . . .”207 In other words, the terms
substantive and procedure, as used in Art. IV, § 5(B), are distinct. They are juxtaposed,
meaning that they are set off against each other. One is not a subset of the other.
Rather, the terms “substantive” and “procedure” are used in their usual and
customary—but nonetheless irremediably vague—senses as antonyms, not in a sense
suggesting that one is subordinated to the other. This is precisely the binary, brightline sense in which the Rockey court understood “substantive right.”208
200

Id. at 1275 (emphasis added).

201

Id.

202

Id.

203

Id. at 1279.

204

See BRYAN A. GARNER GARNER’S MODERN ENGLISH USAGE 873 (4th ed. 2016)
(“substantive . . . B. For substantial. . . . Substantive is more specialized [than substantial],
appearing most often . . . in law (in which it serves as the adjective corresponding to substantive
and as the antonym of procedural <substantial rights>). Some writers misuse substantive for
substantial . . . .”). According to Garner, this misuse is to be rejected as nonstandard American
usage. Id. (“LANGUAGE-USAGE INDEX substantive misused for substantial: Stage 1 . . .
Rejected.”).
205

See OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B).

206

See Krause v. State, 285 N.E.2d 736 (Ohio 1972).

207

Id. at 744.

208

Rockey v. 84 Lumber Co., 611 N.E.2d 789, 789 (Ohio 1993).
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A close reading of Art. IV, § 5(B) confirms the antithetical relationship. In the
phrase “substantive right, the adjective substantive qualifies and limits the noun right.
That qualification indicates that not all rights are beyond the court’s power to “abridge,
enlarge, or modify”; only “substantive” rights are off limits for the court’s
rulemaking.209 The presence of this qualification suggests that Art. IV, § 5(B)
implicitly recognizes the existence of a class of rights distinct from substantive rights.
Because in legal parlance procedural is the most natural antonym of substantive, the
probable meaning is that procedural rights are within the court’s power to “abridge,
enlarge, or modify.”210 If Art. IV, § 5(B) does indeed imply for its limited purposes
the existence of procedural rights, a court-promulgated rule establishing a procedural
right would not offend Art. IV, § 5(B) and might, therefore, be enforceable.
It is not surprising that Art. IV, § 5(B) would rely on the existence of the concept
of procedural right that is contradistinct from a substantive right. The individuals who
proposed the Modern Courts Amendment had full confidence that the
substance/procedure dichotomy was an adequately functional analytic device for
dividing judicial and legislative domains.211
All that said, a court-promulgated rule establishing a procedural right would, of
course, be enforceable only if the rule were in fact procedural, not substantive.212 So,
even a more nuanced reading of Art. IV, § 5(B) that preserves the antithetical
denotation of the terms substance and procedure does not—and cannot—avoid the
inevitable unworkability of the substance/procedure dualism.
Havel’s failure as a persuasive explication of Art. IV, § 5(B) stems from the court’s
ignoring that procedure and substance, as the terms are used in Art. IV, § 5(B), are
juxtaposed in their usual and customary senses as antonyms, not in a sense that makes
one a subset of the other. In the end, Havel leaves unanswered the same central
question that Rockey left unanswered: How does a procedural matter differ from a
substantive matter?213 Simply no principled answer to that question exists. The context
of Art. IV, § 5(B) can no more plausibly support the equivocation the court attempted
in Havel than it can plausibly support the attempt in Rockey to read the temporal
limitation in the supersession clause out of the Amendment.
One final statement must be made about the rule announced in Lovelady and Havel.
Despite the absence of a textual foundation, the rule announced in Lovelady and Havel
recognizing shared rulemaking authority.214 In doing so, those cases placed Ohio into
the majority of states on that issue. Of the other forty-nine states, forty preserve for
state legislatures the entire, or at least some, authority in forming the content of court
rules.215 Of these, seventeen states preserve authority the same way the federal system
209

OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B).

210

Rockey, 611 N.E.2d at 791–92.

211

Cf. Milligan & Pohlman, supra note 54, at 832 (noting that Art. IV, § 5(B) “itself states
that the ‘rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right. . . .’ [Although grey
areas may exist,] this provides a limit to the scope of the rule-making authority. . . .”).
212

Rockey, 611 N.E.2d at 791–92.

213

Havel v. Villa St. Joseph, 963 N.E.2d 1270 (Ohio 2012).

214

Id. at 1272; State ex rel. Loyd v. Lovelady, 840 N.E.2d 1062, 1064–65 (Ohio 2006).

215

See infra note 217 and accompanying text.
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does, by legislative delegation of constitutional authority to the court.216 Analytically,
therefore, these seventeen delegating legislatures have available to them the same
variety of options as those open to Congress.
Delegation is not, of course, the only way states maintain shared authority over the
content of court rules. Of the remaining twenty-three states, twenty explicitly
guarantee a say for the legislature in forming the content of rules. 217 Of these twenty
states, ten do so by allowing the legislature to change or annul court rules after they
become effective,218 six by prohibiting the court from promulgating rules that conflict
with a statute,219 three simply by ordaining only the legislature to prescribe matters of
216

E.g., N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 13(2) (stating the legislature may delegate to supreme court
the authority to make rules for trial courts); WYO. CONST. art. V, § 2 (stating the court has
“superintending control over all inferior courts, under such rules and regulations as may be
prescribed by law”); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-14 (2017) (delegating rulemaking authority to
court by statute); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-2-18 (2017) (delegating rulemaking authority by statute);
IDAHO CODE § 1-213 (2017) (delegating rulemaking authority to court by statute); 735 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5 / 1-104 (2017) (delegating rulemaking authority to court by statute); ME. STAT.
tit. 4, §§ 8, 9A (2017) (delegating rulemaking by statute); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 30A, § 16
(2017) (delegating rulemaking authority to court by statute); MINN. STAT. § 480.051 (2017)
(delegating rulemaking authority to court by statute); MISS. CODE ANN. § 9-3-61 (2017)
(delegating rulemaking authority to court by statute); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-1 (2017)
(delegating rulemaking authority to court by statute); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 27-02-08, 27-02-10
(2017) (delegating rulemaking authority to court by statute); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 1.002(1)(a),
1.735 (2017) (delegating rulemaking authority to court by statute with legislative power to
override); 8 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-6-2 (2017) (delegating rulemaking authority to court by
statute); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-401, 408 (2017) (delegating rulemaking authority to court
by statute); WASH. REV. CODE § 2.04.109 (2017) (delegating rulemaking authority to court by
statute); WIS. STAT. § 751.12(4) (2017) (delegating rulemaking authority to court by statute);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 5-2-113 (2017) (delegating rulemaking authority to court by statute); cf.
Petersen v. State, 594 P.2d 978 (Wyo. 1979).
217

See infra notes 219–23 and accompanying text.

218 E.g., ALA. CONST. amend. 328, § 6.11 (1973) (stating rules of practice and procedure
promulgated by the supreme court “may be changed by a general act of statewide application”);
ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 15 (stating rules of practice and procedure promulgated by the
supreme court “may be changed by the legislature by two-thirds vote of the members elected to
each house”); FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a) (“Rules of court may be repealed by general law
enacted by two-thirds vote of the membership of each house of the legislature.”); MD. CONST.
art. IV, § 18 (stating court rules are law “until rescinded, changed or modified . . . by law”);
MO. CONST. art. V5, § 5 (“Any rule may be annulled or amended in whole or in part by a law
limited to the purpose.”); N.J. CONST. art. VI, §§ 2, 3 (1947) (“The Supreme Court shall make
rules governing the administration of all courts in the State and, subject to the law, the practice
and procedure in all such courts.”); S.C. CONST. art. V, § 4 (“Subject to the statutory law, the
Supreme Court shall make rules governing the practice and procedure in all such courts.”); S.D.
CONST. art. V, § 12 (“The Supreme Court shall have general superintending powers over all
courts and may make rules of practice and procedure and rules governing . . . all courts. . . .
These rules may be changed by the Legislature.”); UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 4 (stating the
legislature may amend court rule “upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses of
the Legislature”); VT. CONST. § 37 (“Any rule adopted by the Supreme Court may be revised
by the General Assembly.”).
219 E.g., LA. CONST. art. V, § 5 (stating the court may “may establish procedural . . . rules
not in conflict with law”); NEB. CONST. art. V, § 25 (“[T]he supreme court may promulgate rules
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practice or procedure,220 and one by leaving it to the legislature to restrict court
rulemaking as it sees fit.221 The remaining three preserve legislative involvement, but
do so in idiosyncratic ways or by preserving only limited authority. 222
VII. OUR PROPOSAL AND HOW IT WOULD RESOLVE THE PROBLEM IN ART. IV, §
5(B)
The difference between Rockey and the Lovelady/Havel line of cases is enormous.
Under Rockey, once the court promulgates a rule pertaining to a matter of procedure,
the General Assembly loses all authority thereafter to legislate in conflict with that
rule.223 Under Lovelady/Havel, however, both the court and the General Assembly
have roles in prescribing the content of rules of practice for Ohio courts. 224 Although
the difference between holdings in Rockey and in Lovelady/Havel could not be more
starkly contradictory, both lines remain authoritative decisions of the Supreme Court
of Ohio.
Although the court has not yet explained why it hesitates to overrule or modify
Rockey’s syllabus 2,225 it may now recognize that Rockey’s disenfranchisement of the
General Assembly is an unworkable, if not indefensible, concept. The exclusivity over
rulemaking that the court announced for itself in Rockey simply cannot be supported
by a textual analysis of Art. IV, § 5(B). But neither can the interpretation of Art. IV, §
. . . not in conflict with laws governing such matters”); TEX. CONST. art. V, § 31(b) (stating the
supreme court shall “promulgate rules of administration not inconsistent with the laws of the
state”); VA. CONST. art. VI, § 5 (stating court “rules shall not be in conflict with the general law
as the same shall, from time to time, be established by the General Assembly.”); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 2.120(1) (2017) (“The Supreme Court may make rules not inconsistent with the . . .
laws of the State for . . . the government of the district courts”); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 51 (McKinney
2017) (stating the court may adopt rules “not inconsistent with . . . statutes of the state”).
220 E.g., CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (stating rules of practice and procedure are statutory; the
court may annually recommend rules of procedure to legislature); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-201
(2017) (stating that rules of procedure are statutory); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1 (2017) (stating
that civil rules of practice and procedure are statutory); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1 (2017) (stating
that criminal rules of practice and procedure are statutory).
221 E.g., IOWA CONST. art. V, § 4 (stating that the court’s authority is exercised “under such
restrictions as the General Assembly may, by law, prescribe”).
222 E.g., PA. CONST. art. V, § 10 (stating that the court has authority to prescribe rules, but
with narrowly limited authority reserved to the legislature); IND. CODE § 34-8-2-1 (2017)
(“[T]he power of the supreme court to adopt, amend, and rescind rules of court does not preclude
the creation, by statute, of alternatives to the change of venue”); Foster v. Overstreet, 905
S.W.2d 504, 507 (Ky. 1995) (holding that the court has exclusive rulemaking authority but
when a rule conflicted with statute, the supreme court “extends comity to the legislature and
upholds the statute”).
223

Rockey v. 84 Lumber Co., 611 N.E.2d 789, 791–92 (Ohio 1993).

224

See, e.g., State ex rel. Loyd v. Lovelady, 840 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 2006).

225

The court’s decisions in Lovelady/Havel did not overrule or modify Rockey’s syllabus 2
by implication. In Lovelady, the court cited Rockey with approval for the proposition that the
court’s constitutional authority over matters of “practice and procedure” is “exclusive.” Indeed,
for a discussion of whether the court currently may have designs on reviving the rule in Rockey,
see discussion infra Section VIII.
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5(B) that Lovelady and Havel advanced. Neither Rockey nor the Lovelady/Havel line
of cases rests on a close textual analysis of the Modern Courts Amendment.226
The court can hardly to be faulted, of course, for failing to discover persuasive
guidance in the current language of the Amendment. The allocation of lawmaking
authority in Art. IV, § 5(B) turns on the false dichotomy between substance and
procedure. Ohio does not have available to it the same detour that the United States
Supreme Court found in Hanna and Burlington Northern for sidestepping the
substance/procedure enigma. 227
The cause of Ohio’s unique futility lies in the very structure of Art. IV, § 5(B). The
present text can never support an unassailable, judicially created patch over the void
that exists in it. At present, Art. IV, § 5(B) states only,
x
x
x

that the supreme court has authority to promulgate rules of practice and
procedure;
that “a substantive right” is something different in kind from a matter of
practice or procedure and something that a court-promulgated rule may
not alter; and
that every statute that is in effect at the time a court rule is duly
promulgated is superseded if the statute conflicts with the rule.228

None of these propositions, either individually or in sum, provides a premise from
which to deduce that the General Assembly has or does not have the authority to
legislate after the court promulgates a rule. The void in Art. IV, § 5(B) similarly is
unanswerable through the common-law process of interpretation and construction.229
Only momentary reflection on Lovelady and Havel, the court’s current reading of
Art. IV, § 5(B), reveals that in those cases the court envisions a constitutional
allocation in which the General Assembly has a role that resembles the shared
authority in rulemaking that exists under the federal Rules Enabling Act. 230 The
proposed amendment would resolve the conflicting rulings in Rockey and
Lovelady/Havel by amending Art. IV, § 5(B) to reflect shared rulemaking authority
that the court itself first recognized in Lovelady and later reaffirmed in Havel.
To repeat, it is rarely wise to pursue a constitutional amendment simply to resolve
inconsistent rulings from the court. But in the instance of Art. IV, § 5(B), the cause of
the inconsistency—and, thus, of the danger that shifting majorities will adopt
conflicting interpretations of Art. IV, § 5(B)—lies in the constitution itself. The flaw
is in the void in the Modern Courts Amendment on the issue that neither Rockey nor
Lovelady/Havel could fill.

226 See Havel v. Villa St. Joseph, 963 N.E.2d 1270 (Ohio 2012); Lovelady, 840 N.E.2d 1062;
Rockey, 611 N.E.2d 789.
227

Burlington Northern v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 6 (1987); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460,
473 (1965).
228

OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B).

229

See id.; see also sources cited supra notes 23–24.

230

See 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (2017); Havel, 963 N.E.2d at 1270; Lovelady, 840 N.E.2d at 1062;
Rockey, 611 N.E.2d at 789.
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The proposal this Article advances avoids trying to resolve the hopelessly vague
substance/procedure distinction. Rather, the proposal addresses directly the void in
Art. IV, § 5(B) regarding where rulemaking authority resides after a duly promulgated
court rule takes effect and after, therefore, existing laws in conflict with the rule are
deemed repealed.
The proposal accepts the allocation of lawmaking authority that was recognized in
Lovelady/Havel, making that allocation explicit in the constitution in order to provide
textual support for a conclusion that—as both the Rockey and Lovelady/Havel lines of
cases amply demonstrate—the present text cannot provide.231
Specifically, the proposal does through interlineation what the Rockey and
Lovelady/Havel were unable to do through interpretation. The proposal would add the
following language:
(B) . . . . The general assembly may change rules promulgated hereunder
by introducing a bill (1) that states specifically in its preamble that it is the
legislature’s purpose to create a substantive right and (2) that is enacted into
law as provided in Article II, Section 16.
This recognition of shared rulemaking authority would immediately mitigate the
perpetual uncertainty about the proper rulemaking domains for the legislature and the
court. Coincidentally, the proposed language embodies the approach taken in those
ten states that expressly allow their legislatures to change or annul court rules after
they become effective.232
Note, finally, that the proposed language distinguishes between a bill and an act.
The distinction would make clear that the declared General Assembly’s intent to
change an existing rule of practice or procedure need not be stated in the enactment
itself; instead, the declaration may appear in the act’s preamble—as was the case in
Lovelady.233 The proposal is more specific, however, regarding the General
Assembly’s declaration than what Havel might permit. In that case, the court found a
committee’s “statement of findings and intent,” which appeared in an uncodified
portion of the bill, to be a sufficient declaration of the General Assembly’s intent.234
The proposal specifies that the purpose must be stated in the preamble, thus excluding
expressions of individual legislators or committees that might never have been before
either house.

231

See Havel, 963 N.E.2d at 1270; Lovelady, 840 N.E.2d at 1062; Rockey, 611 N.E.2d at

789.
232

See supra note 219 and accompanying text.

233

Lovelady, 840 N.E.2d at 1064–65.

234

Havel, 963 N.E.2d at 1278 (“The uncodified language of S.B. 80 includes a ‘statement
of findings and intent’ made by the General Assembly. S.B. 80, Section 3, 150 Ohio Laws, Part
V, at 8024. In the legislative statement to which the court referred, the General Assembly
asserted, ‘The current civil litigation system represents a challenge to the economy of the state
of Ohio,’ and recognized that ‘a fair system of civil justice strikes an essential balance between
the rights of those who have been legitimately harmed and the rights of those who have been
unfairly sued.’ Section 3(A)(1) and (2), id. The General Assembly further declared that
‘[r]eform to the punitive damages law in Ohio [was] urgently needed to restore balance, fairness,
and predictability to the civil justice system.’ Section 3(A)(4)(a), id. at 8025.”).
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HAS THE SUPREME COURT SUGGESTED THAT IT MIGHT OVERRULE LOVELADY
AND HAVEL?

The prospect that the Supreme Court of Ohio may revive Rockey is not idle
speculation. In fact, the court may currently contemplate overruling Lovelady/Havel.
In 2016, this proposal was presented to the Ohio Constitutional Modernization
Commission.235 The Commission received two comments opposing the proposed
amendment.236 The first letter was longer and more fully developed than the second,
was written on the Supreme Court of Ohio’s stationery, and was signed by the court’s
Administrative Director.237 The letter contained no explicit statement indicating
whether the director was expressing the court’s view or only his own.238
The letter opposed the proposal because, according to the director, the amendment
“would significantly alter the current distribution of judicial rulemaking powers
between the Supreme Court of Ohio and the Ohio General Assembly.” 239 The letter
then presents a wide-ranging and heavily footnoted polemic.240 Yet, the analysis was
flawed beyond what the trappings of scholarship could salvage.
The director begins, ominously, by mischaracterizing the proposal.241 He contends
that “the purpose of [the] new language is to clarify the distinction between substantive
right and procedure.”242 He misconstrues the proposal. The proposed amendment does
not attempt any clarification of these terms. Clarification is impossible.243 The
Supreme Court of the United States and scholars alike have accepted for decades the

235

Ohio Constitutional Modernization Comm’n, Minutes of the Judicial Branch & Admin.
of
Justice
Comm.
Meeting
2
(Jan.
12,
2017),
http://ocmc.ohio.gov/ocmc//uploads/Judicial%20Branch%20and%20Administration%20of%2
0Justice%20Committee/JBAJ%20%20Meeting%20Packet%20Part%20I%20(2017.03.09).pdf.
236 Letter from Michael L. Buenger, Admin. Dir., to Janet Gilligan Abaray, Chair, Judicial
Branch & Admin. of Justice Comm. (Jan. 10, 2017), reprinted in Ohio Constitutional
Modernization Comm’n, Minutes of the Judicial Branch & Admin. of Justice Comm. Meeting
25
(Mar.
9,
2017),
http://ocmc.ohio.gov/ocmc//uploads/Judicial%20Branch%20and%20Administration%20of%2
0Justice%20Committee/JBAJ%20%20Meeting%20Packet%20Part%20I%20(2017.03.09).pdf [hereinafter Buenger Letter];
Letter from Ronald Kopp, President, Ohio B. Ass’n, to Janet Gilligan Abaray, Chair, Judicial
Branch
&
Admin.
of
Justice
Comm.
(Mar.
8,
2017),
http://www.ocmc.ohio.gov/ocmc//uploads/Judicial%20Branch%20and%20Administration%2
0of%20Justice%20Committee/03.08.2017%20OSBA%20letter%20to%20Chair%20Abaray.p
df [hereinafter Kopp Letter].
237

Buenger Letter, supra note 236, at 25–32; Kopp Letter, supra note 236, at 1.

238

Kopp Letter, supra note 236, at 1–2.

239

Buenger Letter, supra note 236, at 25.

240

See id.

241

Id. at 25–26.

242

Id.

243

Id. at 25.
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futility of relying on the substance/procedure dualism to separate domains of
rulemaking authority.244
The director takes better aim when he focuses, not on the substance/procedural
duality, but on allocation of rulemaking authority. Although his aim may be better on
this issue, the director simply shoots at the wrong target.
The director believes that the authors crafted their proposal for the purpose of
subverting the status and prerogative that the Supreme Court of Ohio currently enjoys
in promulgating rules of practice and procedure.245 According to the director:
The proposal could effectively shift procedural rulemaking authority from
the Supreme Court of Ohio to the Ohio General Assembly. . . . [T]he
addition of the new sentence would ultimately render that [court’s] power
superficial at best. Using the moniker of “substantive right,” the General
Assembly could effect considerable and largely unreviewable changes to
rules of practice and procedure.246
Of course, the proposal would etch into the constitution a role for the legislature in
forging the rules that govern procedure in the courts of Ohio. 247 But to perceive the
proposed amendment is the proximate cause for the emergence of a role is to ignore
Lovelady and Havel.
Ignoring those cases is exactly what the director does— conspicuously. Although
Lovelady has been the law in Ohio since 2006 and Havel since 2012, the director’s
argument makes no reference to the holdings in either of those cases—namely that the
General Assembly may legislate on a matter of procedure if, in doing so, “the General
Assembly intended to create a substantive right.” 248 Nor does his letter suggest that
that the proposed amendment somehow distorts the holdings in Lovelady or Havel.249
Rather, the supreme court’s administrative director argues against the proposed
amendment on the unspoken premise that the specific rulings recognizing a role of the
General Assembly are not already the law of Ohio.250
In the preceding section, the authors have argued that the conflicting holdings in
Rockey and Lovelady/Havel have given rise to the rare instance where merely
244

Id. at 26.

245

Id. at 25.

246

Id. at 25–26.

247

Id. at 25.

248

State ex rel. Loyd v. Lovelady, 840 N.E.2d 1062, 1064–65 (Ohio 2006).

249

See Buenger Letter, supra note 236, at 25. The leading treatise on the Ohio Constitution
makes the very same oversight. Discussing the scope of the Supreme Court of Ohio’s
rulemaking authority under the Modern Courts Amendment, Professors Steinglass and Scarselli
state that rules promulgated by the Supreme Court of Ohio “cannot be amended or overridden
by the General Assembly.” Steinglass and Scarselli, supra note 62, at 202. As authority for that
proposition, they cite “Rockey v. 84 Lumber Co. 1993.” Id. (citing Rockey v. 84 Lumber Co.,
611 N.E.2d 789 (Ohio 1993). In characterizing the supreme court’s rulemaking authority as
exclusive, they—like the supreme court’s administrative director—take no account of Lovelady,
although it had been decided five years before their treatise’s publication date.
250

Buenger Letter, supra note 236, at 25–26.
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conflicting interpretations warrant amending the constitution. Unless the sharing of
rulemaking authority—which Lovelady and Havel recognize—is chiseled into the
constitution, the court may sometime in the future exercise its common-law
prerogative to overrule the authority of those cases. In fact, the director’s letter outlines
the rubric that the court might use to do away with the holdings in Lovelady and
Havel.251
According to the director’s argument, state courts differ both constitutionally and
pragmatically from trial and appellate courts in the federal system. 252 He reminds us
that, although Ohio courts of appeals and common pleas are constitutional creatures,
allocation of responsibilities between the Congress and the federal judiciary
is not grounded in constitutional design but is framed by the specific
language of the Rules Enabling Act and more broadly by Congress’s
general authority under U.S. Constitution, Article III . . . . All federal courts,
other than the U.S. Supreme Court, are creations of statute.253
The director gives examples why “[s]tate courts are not mirror images of federal
courts” because “they can have vastly different and more expansive
responsibilities.”254 He concludes that the differences run so deep and so wide that
neither Ohio nor any other state can fruitfully look to the federal system’s model of
shared rulemaking authority.255
To demonstrate that federal-style delegation does not fit judicial rulemaking for
state courts, the director offers statistics to demonstrate that most states are like
Ohio.256 He points out that other state courts, like the Supreme Court of Ohio, exercise
rulemaking authority by constitutional allocation, not by delegation.257
If statistics are to hold any sway on the question of shared rulemaking authority,
the relevant statistic is not how many states’ constitutions recognize their courts’
rulemaking authority. Rather, the relevant statistic is the number of states that preserve
a role for the legislature in the rulemaking process, regardless of whether the court
possesses rulemaking authority by constitutional allocation or statutory delegation. A
lingering authority in the legislature is, after all, what Lovelady/Havel recognized and
what the director argues against.258 As demonstrated at the conclusion of section VI,
the facts do not support the director’s argument. Only a distinct minority of Ohio’s

251

See id.

252

Id. at 26.

253

Id.

254

Id. at 29.

255

Id. at 29, 32.

256

Id. at 27.

257

Id. (“Ohio—as most other states—differ [sic] remarkably from the federal model by
constitutionally vesting rulemaking authority directly in the state judiciary.”). The director
counts 31 states as doing so. Id.
258

Havel v. Villa St. Joseph, 963 N.E.2d 1270, 1277–78 (Ohio 2012); State ex rel. Loyd v.
Lovelady, 840 N.E.2d 1062, 1064 (Ohio 2006); Buenger Letter, supra note 236, at 25.
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sister states—nine259 of forty-nine260—share the director’s view that a state legislature
should have no role in forming the content of rules for state courts.
Aside from statistics, the centerpiece of the director’s argument against the
proposal is that Ohio’s principal courts—supreme, appellate, and common pleas—are
created by the Ohio Constitution, while federal appellate and trial courts are merely
statutory creatures.261 This distinction between the constitutional versus statutory
nature of courts, according to the director, amounts to a difference so “subtle but
important” as to make unthinkable the notion that the Ohio legislature might have
retained any role that resembles Congress’s role in a rulemaking system.262 This
argument, however, flatly ignores history in two important ways.
First, Ohio’s principal courts have existed as entities created by the constitution
since 1802.263 That is to say, since Ohio’s founding, its trial courts and, later, its courts
of appeals, have been fixtures in the state constitution.264 Over those years, the General
Assembly repeatedly has enacted laws regulating practice and procedure in those
courts.265 Never during those 150 years was it thought constitutionally impermissible
for the General Assembly to write those rules.266 If the legislature has lost the
constitutional authority that it has exercised since 1802, that change occurred only
since and because of adoption of the Modern Courts Amendment. More specifically,
the change would have occurred despite Art. IV, § 5(B)’s silence on the subject of
whether the legislature has any authority after the court adopts a rule of practice or
procedure.267 Silence itself is not a mandate for disenfranchisement of an authority that

259 E.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. 6, § 5, cl. 5; ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 3; COLO. CONST. art. VI,
§ 21; DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 13; HAW. CONST. art. VI, § 7; MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 5; MONT.
CONST. art. VII, § 2(3); N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 73-a; W.V. CONST. art. VIII, § 3.
260

See supra notes 219–23 and accompanying text.

261

Buenger Letter, supra note 236, at 26–28.

262

Id. at 28–29 (“Given the subtle but important differences regarding the role of federal
and state courts, there is a high need to preserve state judicial authority over a wider range of
issues affecting the judicial branch if only to ensure access to a judicial forum for the peaceful
resolution of virtually any dispute. To understand state court rulemaking through the prism of
federal court rulemaking is to improperly conflate America's dual constitutional system (and by
extension its dual court system) into a single system of understandings. . . . . That the people of
Ohio have decided on a different distribution of governing power does not make that distribution
improper or invalid.”).
263 OHIO CONST. art. III, §§ 2 (supreme court), 3 (common pleas) (1802). The appellate
courts in Ohio were not created under the constitution until adoption of the Constitution of 1850.
OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 3; Barbara A. Terzian, Ohio’s Constitutions: An Historical Perspective,
51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 357, 365 (2004).
264

OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B).

265

See sources cited supra note 3.

266

Id.; see OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B).

267

See OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B).
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has been exercised continually since the state’s founding. In fact, Ohio law has long
disapproved the implied repeal of constitutional provisions.268
Second and more pointedly, the court’s actions since the Modern Courts
Amendment was adopted refutes the argument that federal-style sharing is impossible
because Ohio’s court system is deeply and widely different from the federal system.
A survey of the court’s rulemaking activity since it acquired its rulemaking authority
reveals that the court itself does not see the same radical difference between the Ohio
and federal systems that its administrator director perceives.269
Look at the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, the criminal rules, and the rules of
appellate procedure. Look, too, at the Ohio Rules of Evidence. All were promulgated
by the Supreme Court of Ohio under authority of Art. IV, § 5(B).270 In each instance,
the court obtained the skeleton and almost all of the flesh for these creatures of Ohio
law from federal models.271 Look further at the Modern Courts Amendment itself. That
is the headwater for the court’s rulemaking authority. Again, Ohio looked to a federal
model for the foundation on which to lay the bedrock for Ohio’s entire system of courtpromulgated rules.272 This time, it looked to the federal Rules Enabling Act as it
existed at that time, and it adopted the federal concepts and structure.273 In fact, Ohio
followed the federal form more faithfully than all but a handful of other states.274 Ohio
lifted the three core elements of Art. IV, § 5(B) verbatim from the Rules Enabling Act,
and it remained silent on the same issues upon which the federal Rules Enabling Act
was silent.275
The glaring reality is that, for the past half century, Ohio has regarded the federal
system as its pattern-maker-of-choice on rulemaking matters. The Supreme Court of
Ohio has not so much as looked at another possible guide during its fifty-year voyage
down the rulemaking path.276 We have traveled too far down that road for the navigator
to now suggest that the maps it repeatedly chose to chart this trip were plotted for a
different continent.

268 See, e.g., State ex rel. Hoyt v. Metcalfe, 88 N.E. 738, 741 (Ohio 1909) (“Repeals by
implication are not favored with respect to statutes, and for a stronger reason they should not be
favored with respect to constitutional provisions. The repugnancy, to work a repeal, must be
wholly irreconcilable, as the intention to repeal will not be presumed, nor the effect of the repeal
admitted unless the inconsistency is unavoidable.”); see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 67,
at 337 (“Repeals by implication are disfavored—very much disfavored. But a provision that
flatly contradicts an earlier-enacted provision repeals it.”) (internal quotations omitted); see
generally id. passim.
269

See Rothstein, supra note 91, at 125–73.

270

OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B).

271

Rothstein, supra note 91, at 125–73.

272

See supra note 41 and accompanying text.

273

Id.

274

See supra notes 221–25 and accompanying text.
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See supra Part II.
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See Parness & Manthey, supra note 3, at 250–55.
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Of course, the court has modified, to some extent, each of the federal models to
make them fit Ohio’s needs. 277 But, despite the changes, the similarities between the
Ohio rules and their federal prototypes remain deep and tight. Because those
similarities endure, the burden was on the director to show that the difference between
constitutionally and statutorily created courts has somehow influenced the Supreme
Court of Ohio’s rulemaking activity. Did the court, for example, modify any federal
prototypes in order to account for the constitutional nature of the Ohio trial and
appellate courts? One will find that in the Supreme Court of Ohio’s nearly fifty years
of rulemaking, the court never once cited the constitutional/statutory distinction as the
reason why any Ohio rule of practice or procedure had to be written differently from
its federal model.278
The director’s rubric for dismissing shared rulemaking-authority as a workable
method for Ohio is analytically transparent. More than eighty percent of the other
states have adopted the opposite view about sharing. That fact alone exposes the
flimsiness of the director’s argument.279
But the very weaknesses of the argument sparks suspicion. In light of Art. IV, §
5(B)’s silence280 on the pivotal question that the Rockey and the Lovelady/Havel cases
tried unsuccessfully to answer, the director’s rubric, albeit thin, may eventually be all
the Supreme Court of Ohio would demand to overrule Lovelady and Havel. Does a
public endorsement of the argument from the court’s administrative director portend
that reversal when, at some point, the question next comes before the court?
IX. CONCLUSION
Currently, if a statute were to satisfy the two conditions identified in this proposal
to amend Art. IV, § 5(B), the statute would necessarily satisfy the requirements
announced in Lovelady/Havel. In other words, the proposal to amend Art. IV, § 5(B)
would not change the result of any case currently controlled by the rule announced in
those cases.
277

See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text.

278

There have been many instances, of course, when language in a federal rule was rejected
and rewritten for Ohio. The reasons have been many. On very rare occasion, a rule was revised
due to constitutional concerns. See, e.g., 1980 Ohio Staff Note, Evid.R. 501, General Rule
regarding Privileges (“[T]he difficult lines to be drawn between rules of procedure and
substantive law so frequently encountered in evidence rules are no more clearly demonstrated
than in the area of privileges. In adopting by reference privilege statutes and common law
constructions the direct confrontation is avoided [in Ohio Evid.R. 501].”). That Staff Note
recognizes that a similar difficulty exists also with rules regarding competency of witnesses.
See id. (“Closely related to the question of privilege is the question of competency of
witnesses.”). 1980 Ohio Staff Note, Evid.R 601, General Rule Regarding Competency of
Witnesses explains Ohio Rule 601 had to differ from its federal counterpart because the
respective rules had to take account, for example, of the fact that the General Assembly and
Congress had enacted statutes addressing different factors that affect competence of witnesses
These constitutional concerns, however, involved “the lines to be drawn [in Art. IV, § 5(B)]
between . . . procedure and substantive law.” They did not in any way implicate the difference
between constitutional and statutory courts.
279

Buenger Letter, supra note 236, at 25–32.

280

See supra note 64 et seq. and accompanying text.
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By making these conditions explicit in the constitution and, therefore, permanent,
the proposal would guarantee that the Supreme Court of Ohio would never revert to
Rockey-like interpretation of Art. IV, § 5(B). When the conditions recognized in
Lovelady/Havel are added to the current wording, Art. IV, § 5(B) will finally answer
the question on which it has heretofore been silent. With the proposed enhancement,
the amendment will establish a partnership between the court and the legislature on
matters of practice and procedure and, thereby, prevent the court from ever again
finding a mutually exclusive allocation of authority between it and the General
Assembly. What’s more, the proposal would render the false dichotomy between
substance and procedure constitutionally insignificant. As a result of these effects, the
court would never again serve both as the sole lawgiver on matters of practice and
procedure and also as the sole judge of whether the actions it took as lawgiver fit
within constitutional strictures that restrain the court in exercising its rulemaking
authority.
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